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INTRODUCTION

At first glance, few corporate law principles seem to be better
established than the widely prevailing rule that a controlling shareholder
may receive a control premium for its shares.' From a comparative law
perspective, however, this consensus may seem surprising, because the
United States stands virtually alone in failing to accord minority
shareholders any presumptive right to share in a control premium.' Yet,

'For the generalization that U.S. law today normally permits the sale of control at a
premium, see ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 11.4, at 478 (1986). See also I
ANALYSIS AND

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.16, at 373 (1992) (discussing sales of control and its effects on
controlling and minority shareholders). This topic is an ancient and possibly overwritten theme
in corporate law. Among the standard articles are: William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's
Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965) (stating that
minority shareholders should be given an equal opportunity to sell their stock on the same
terms as the sale of the controlling block); Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders
in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072 (1983) (discussing tile
positive and negative effects of an "equal treatment rule" in internal and third party

transactions); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698 (1982) (arguing that those who produce a gain should be allowed to keep it,
subject to the constraint that other parties to the transaction be "at least as well off as they were
before the transaction"); Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where
We Stand Today, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 248 (1986) (discussing the U.S. rule and the
support it has received from economists as well as the recognized exceptions to this rule);

Thomas L. Hazen, The Sale of Corporate Control: Towards a Three-Tiered Approach, 4 J.
CORP. L. 263 (1978) (analyzing the different rules applied to control sales and proposing that
the rule ultimately applied be determined by the type of corporation involved in the
transaction); Saul X. Levmore, A Primer on the Sale of CorporateControl, 65 TEx. L. REV.
1061 (1987) (reviewing DAVID C. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL: A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (1986)).
2
To fully document this claim would itself require an article.

Nonetheless, the

following items of evidence are offered in support of this generalization.

European law
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from an economic perspective, the permissive U.S. rule is not surprising
because economists generally agree that economic efficiency is promoted
by privately negotiated control transfers at premiums not offered to
minority shareholders?

strongly discourages partial bids and often imposes a buyout requirement on the control buyer
under which it must buyout the minority shareholders at the same price as paid to the control
seller. See Deborah A. DeMott, ComparativeDimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65 WASti.
U. L.Q. 69 (1987) (discussing takeover regulations in the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, and
Australia). For example, in Britain, the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers has adopted the City
Code on Take-Overs and Mergers, which requires the Panel to approve any partial tender offer,
precluding a tender for more than 30% and less than 100%. Id. at 93-94. A minority of the
shareholders must approve any offer within this range. Id Additionally, Rule 34 of the City
Code requires any person who acquires 30% or more of the voting securities of the target to
offer to buy out the remaining shareholders at the highest price paid by the acquiring person
or its associates within the preceding 12 months. Id at 94-95. This buyout requirement is
intended to ensure that "all shareholders ... will share equally in any premium paid by a buyer
so long as at least thirty percent of the company's shares are sold." Id. at 95. Belgian law has
somewhat similar provisions, requiring that minority shareholders, who are bought out, must
receive the same terms as those given the control block. See Robert Wtterwulghe, Takeover
Bids in Belgium, 5 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MARKET L. 41, 48 (1983) (examining Belgian
law regarding takeover bids). However, this provision appears not to be effectively
implemented. Id, Outside of Europe, there are few examples of law explicitly dealing with
control premiums; however, those statutes that do address the issue generally implement some
form of equal opportunity. DeMott, supra, at 100-09. Canadian corporate law tends to
resemble that ofthe United States, but deviates in its treatment of control premiums. Id. at 99.
Under the Ontario statute, an offeror must make a "takeover bid" to all the corporation's
shareholders equally, unless certain limited exemptions apply. Id. at 100. One exemption
permits private purchases from 14 or less persons, but even in this case if the buyer acquires
more than 20 of the target's voting stock, it must make a follow-up offer to all shareholders
if a premium has been paid. Id. Quebec has a similar statute, which also intends to ensure the
sharing of control premiums. See id. at 100-03. Under Australian law, any acquisition of 20o
or more of voting securities must be through a general offer to all shareholders or a regulated
stock exchange bid. Id. at 108-09. Under Brazilian law, anyone proposing a control transfer
is required to offer similar terms to all shareholders and not to engage in specific negotiations
with any individual shareholder. See Modesto Carvalhosa, The Brazilian Experience With
Respect to Tender Offers, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEcs. REG. 103, 104-05 (1981) (discussing
the regulation of tender offers in Brazil).
3
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of CorporateControl,
1994 Q. J. ECON. 957 (comparing the "market rule" of the U.S. with the "equal opportunity
rule" ofother nations); Hamilton, supranote 1,at 252-62 (outlining economists' view that sales
governed by the U.S. rule increase efficient transactions); Benjamin Hermalin & Alan
Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies,25 J. LEGAL STuD. 351 (June 1996) (recommending
thatminority shareholders should be entitled to no more than "the preinvestmentmarket value"
of their shares on any subsequent squeeze-out merger); Marcel Kahan, Sales of Corporate
Control,9 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 368 (1993) (positing that the U.S. rule allows for more
efficient transfers than the equal opportunity rule, especially when higher fractions of shares
are sold).
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The puzzling fact that this presumptively efficient rule is accepted
only in the United States is compounded by a further puzzle: the rule is
only followed some of the time.4 A number of amorphous exceptions to
the general rule exist, which seem chiefly to apply when the percentage
of shares held by the control seller is low.' Close students of U.S.
corporate law have suggested a possible explanation: because both
efficient and inefficient control transfers are possible, the standard
exceptions to the general rule may have been tailored to exclude precisely
those transactions most likely to be inefficient transfers in which the
control acquirer intends to exploit the private benefits of control.6
Professor Einer Elhauge, the leading exponent of this provocative theory,
calls this interpretation of the case law, as will this article, the "triggering
thesis."7
Although appealing, the triggering thesis is still vulnerable to some
obvious criticisms: First, cases requiring a control seller to share the
control premium with other shareholders are very few in number and
none are recent. In comparison, inefficient control transfers appear to be
a recurring and relatively common phenomena.9 Thus, the distinct

4

See Einer Elhauge, The TriggeringFunctionof Sale of ControlDoctrine, 59 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1465, 1467 (1992) (analyzing the recognized exceptions to the general rule).
5
1d. (noting the ambiguity and open-ended nature of these exceptions, which can, "if
read broadly, easily engulf the general rule"). "[S]cholars are in widespread agreement that,
as currently formulated, the [general rule] is 'confused' and 'chaotic'. . . .The problem is that
the [rule] lacks any coherent principles or policies that might guide the resolution of these
ambiguities and suggest limits to the exceptions." Id. at 1481.
6
See Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1465 (discussing the conflicting legal doctrines applied
to control sales and proposing that the triggering approach be employed because it incorporates
the positive attributes of each doctrine). Elhauge suggests that the triggering approach should
be applied to sales of control instead of the doctrines currently proposed by academics, Id. at
1466-67. Two schools of thought exist regarding the sale of control phenomenon. The "equal
sharing" approach dictates that noncontrolling shareholders should always have the right to
share in control sales at premium prices. Id. at 1465; see also Andrews, supra note 1, at 505
(discussing the "equal opportunity" rule). The "deregulatory approach" proposes that
noncontrolling shareholders should nevershare in premium control shares. Elhauge, supranote
4, at 1486-93; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 698 (supporting a deregulatory
approach and suggesting that "unequal division" of gains from control transfers increase
wealth). See Kahan, supra note 3, at 368, for a critique of the triggering approach.
7
Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1502-32.
'Relatively recent cases have, however, rejected the claim that noncontrolling
shareholders must be given the same opportunity to sell at the same premium. See,e.g., Martin
v. Marlin, 529 So.2d 1174, 1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Shoafv. Warlick, 380 S.E.2d 865,
867 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
"See discussion infra notes 196-208 and accompanying text. Negative stock price
returns, on the date that a transaction is announced, is one measure of a prospectively
inefficient transaction. Industrial organization economists have been far more skeptical than
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possibility surfaces that this body of law simply may not matter very
much. A second problem with the triggering thesis as a public policy is
the high risk that it imposes on the control seller, who may be required
to surrender the control premium it received if the transaction is later
deemed inefficient. The difference may often be a marginal one, thus,
making the penalty seemingly disproportionate and the seller a defacto
insurer for the buyer's subsequent conduct.
In reality, control
transactions do not neatly subdivide into two categories (efficient and
inefficient), but combine elements of each. Thus, the triggering thesis
inevitably leads to a remedy that is sometimes underinclusive while other
times overinclusive.
As a result, although this article agrees with Professor Elhauge's
important claim that corporate law should seek to distinguish inefficient
from efficient control transfers, it doubts that such an attempt can be
successfully implemented by using the sale of control doctrine, as well
as its exceptions, as the vehicle by which to classify control transactions.
In truth, control transactions can be both, motivated in part by efficiencypromoting justifications and in part by the inefficient desire of the control
seeker to consume the private benefits of control. Precisely for this
reason, prophylactic rules that attempt to discourage entire classes of
transactions are potentially overbroad and dangerous, particularly when
implemented through retrospective litigation.
But what is the alternative? This article will argue that a more
effective technique is to allocate the control premium between an efficient
component (i.e., that portion paid based on efficient-promoting motives)
and an inefficient component (i.e., that portion paid to consume the
private benefits of control). This recognizes that in any transaction both
motives may be present to varying degrees. In short, public policy
should attempt to classify the premium, not the transaction, thus, avoiding
the all-or-nothing problems associated with relying on the exceptions to
the sale of control doctrine. Such a more discriminating allocation could
be attempted either in an appraisal proceeding or, more importantly, at
the time the control acquirer attempts to acquire the remaining minority
interest in the corporation in a squeeze-out transaction. The goal would

financial economists about the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions. Professor Caves
summarizes their views with the generalization that "ex post evidence on the efficiency of
mergers ... amounts to a convincing rejection of the presumed efficiency of mergers." See
Richard E. Caves, Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on the Economy An Industrial
OrganizationPerspective, in Lynn E. Browne & Eric S. Rosengren, TiIE MERGER Bom, 149,
150 (Federal Bank of Boston 1987). See also DAVID J. RAvENSCR FT & F.M. SciEErEn,
MERGERS, SELL-OFFS AND EcoNoMIc EFFICIENCY 220-21 (1987) (stating that European mergers
have "exhibited little or no tendency to raise profitability andlor efficiency").
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be to assure minority shareholders that the "fair price" promised them by
existing Delaware precedents protected them from any diminution in
value in a squeeze-out merger because of the payment of the control
premium."
The mechanics of this approach will be postponed until later;
however, its key doctrinal attraction is that it is based on principles
already latent in the Delaware case law. That is, Delaware law entitles
minority shareholders in appraisal proceedings to their proportionate value
in the existing enterprise. Although appraisal proceedings are an
unwieldy remedy that smaller shareholders infrequently elect, this concept
of proportionate value can be generalized to apply to other contexts as
well. In this light, this article seeks to offer an integrated rationale by
which principles developed in the context of Delaware appraisal
proceedings can be reconciled with the better known Delaware precedents
dealing with the fiduciary duties of a controlling shareholder who is
seeking to acquire the remaining minority interest. Ultimately, the
purpose of this effort is to achieve the same goals as those sought by the
triggering thesis: namely, to encourage efficient transactions and chill
inefficient ones.
To approach this goal, this article will begin by examining the
triggering thesis from a broader-angled perspective. Its focus will expand
beyond the doctrinal law on control premiums to a broader set of both
state and federal legal rules that expose control seekers who pay control
premiums to the danger that they will be forced to overpay in order to
acquire complete ownership. The initial purpose of this survey will be to
evaluate the degree to which these rules do or can perform the function
of distinguishing efficient transactions from inefficient ones.
Among the legal rules that may inhibit an acquirer from paying a
control premium that it is unwilling to offer to the noncontrolling
shareholders, four stand out:
(I)
the valuation standard in appraisal, which may or may not
subject the minority's shares to a minority discount;"

"MThe
result is to create a disincentive for the acquirer to pay a premium for reasons
unrelated to expected increases in the total value of the corporation because the acquirer will
be forced to overpay in order to eliminate the minority. To illustrate, if the acquirer paid $ 10
per share for the 25% block held by a controlling shareholder in a corporation with an $8 per
share intrinsic value, in order to exploit the "minority" by merging them out at $5 per share,
the court could enjoin any merger below $8 per share.

"For recent decisions rejecting minority discounts, see Brown v. Allied Corrugated
Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a minority shareholder,
seeking involuntary dissolution, cannot receive less than the dissolution would result in merely
because a controlling shareholder invokes a buyout remedy); Cavalier Oil Corp, v. Hartnett,
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the post-Weinberger case law in Delaware that requires a

controlling shareholder to deal fairly with the minority shareholders if it
decides to eliminate them in a cash-out merger, 2
(3) the "best price" rule of the Williams Act that sometimes
entitles the minority to receive the same premium paid to the control
seller, 3 and
(4) the related "going private" rules adopted by the SEC under

the Williams Act that strongly encourage the control seeker to 4offer the
same control premium to all shareholders on equivalent terms.1

564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) (criticizing minority discounts as penalizing the minority wvhile
affording a windfall to the majority); Johnson v. Hickory Creek Nursery, 521 N.E.2d 236 (11.
App. Ct. 1988) (refusing to apply a minority discount when it is "assumed" by the remaining
shareholders, causing a substantial pro rata share increase for the remainder); Eyler v. Eyler,
492 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1986) (holding that minority discounts are inapplicable to valuation of
stock in divorce proceedings where the husband and wife own 90.2% of the outstanding
shares); Woodward v. Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Iowa 1964), modified, 136 N.W.2d 280
(Iowa 1965) (rejecting minority discounts to ensure that the minority receives the "real" value
of their stock); In re McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1004-05 (Me. 1989) (stating that use of
minority discounts in valuation results in a transfer ofwealth to the majority from the minority,
encouraging squeeze-outs); Rigel Corp. v. Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d 579 (Neb. 1994) (holding that
minority discounts cannot be considered when determining the value of a dissenting minority's
shares in order for that group to be fully compensated); Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 87
N.Y.2d 161, 167 (N.Y. 1995) (rejecting minority discounts because they deprive the minority
of their "proportionate interest in going concerns," violate the theory of equal treatment in
buyouts, and encourage oppression by the majority) (citations omitted).
Nonetheless, some decisions continue to recognize minority discounts in appraisal
proceedings. See Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Miss. 1985), aff'd, 796
F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986); Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ind. 1983),
aff'd, 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984); Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245
(Ga. CL App. 1984); Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 535 N.E.2d 927 (I1. App. CL 1989);
Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 630 P.2d 167 (Kan. CL App. 1981). A few decisions have even
accepted minority discounts in buyout cases. See McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc.,
724 P.2d 232 (N.M. CL App. 1986).
"See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (applying the entire
fairness standard, as formulated in Weinberger, to claims arising from a cash-out merger);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714-15 (Del. 1983) (holding that the entire fairness
of a merger is shown by proving both fair dealing and fair price).
"See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-I0 (1995). Section 14d-10 provides in pertinent part:
(a)
No bidder shall make a tender offer unless:
(1)
The tender offer is open to all security holders of the
class of securities subject to the tender offer;, and
(2)
The consideration paid to any security holder
pursuant to the tender offer is the highest consideration paid
to any other security holder during such tender offer.
Id; see also
infra
notes 35-60 and accompanying text which further analyze this provision.
'4See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g) (1995); see also infra text and accompanying notes 4770 for a discussion of this provision.
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Although the aggregate impact of these rules is uncertain, they
could, in theory, counterbalance or even outweigh the impact of a state
law rule that formally permits the control seller to monopolize the control
premium. 5 If so, the prevailing rule on control premiums might have
less actual impact than generally thought because the collective effect of
federal law and these other state law rules offset its permissive approach.
This dissonance between the prevailing rule authorizing control premiums
and the various rules that undercut such may help explain and minimize
the seeming disparity between U.S. law and that of most other nations on
this topic. 6 More importantly, it hints that U.S. law may well already
attempt to distinguish between efficient and inefficient control transfers,
even if the existing sale of control doctrine does not adequately perform
this function.
Tempting as this hypothesis may seem, it is premature to conclude
that the broader U.S. law somehow distinguishes efficient from inefficient
control transactions. First, no invisible hand exists to coordinate the
distinct legal doctrines which this article will survey; rather, they are
applied by different courts at different times with different goals in mind.
Second, no strong consensus exists as to which types of control
transactions are most or least likely to promote efficiency; nor is there
agreement as to whether any class of transactions is sufficiently suspect
as to merit chilling. Finally, the triggering thesis is not easily testable.
At best, it is highly debatable whether the transactions that are
discouraged under a specified legal regime, particularly one with
inconsistent legal rules, would have been efficient or inefficient.
Thus, this article's starting point is to assume that the best unifying
rationale for the various doctrines associated with control transfers is to
distinguish efficient from inefficient transactions 7 and then ask how this
goal can best be implemented.
Any such attempt at doctrinal integration requires that we look at
two related contexts which are usually analyzed separately: (1) the sale
of control transaction, and (2) the squeeze-out merger. In the first
context, proponents of an "equal opportunity" rule have debated for
decades with the advocates of control premiums."8 Today, the consensus

"See supra note I and accompanying text for commentary which discusses this general
position. 6
' See supra notes 1-2 for a compilation of authorities highlighting the distinction
between U.S. law and that of foreign jurisdictions.
"7 For a similar view, see Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1465-67 (noting that control
doctrines must be integrated to optimize efficient transactions).
"See generally Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1465 for a general summary of these
conflicting views.
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view is that the latter have largely won because they have shown that an
equal opportunity rule, entitling all shareholders to the same premium,

will deter a greater number of efficient than inefficient transactions.' 9 In
the second context, the primary issue has been the price that the

controlling shareholder must pay to eliminate the minority in a squeezeout merger. Is it enough to pay simply the existing market price of the
stock? Or must the controlling shareholder pay more, possibly even

including some portion of the gains that it expects to realize after
excluding the minority? Regardless of the context, the policy question

remains the same: will any proposed rule deter more efficient
transactions than inefficient transactions?
The fact that these contexts are linked proves little unless one can

suggest an integrated answer. As a starting point toward such an answer,
this article begins with the normative principle that the shareholders
should be entitled to their proportionate interest in the corporation, absent
any discount for minority status. This principle has long been followed
by Delaware 0 and was recently adopted in New York appraisal

proceedings." However, even in Delaware, the concept is only partially
recognized because it is viewed as a valuation principle and not a basis
for broader class-wide relief.'

Because appraisal proceedings are

relatively uncommon, particularly in comparison to actions challenging
the fairness of a merger, the rule against minority discounts is wellestablished, 2 but effectively of minimal significance.

'9See Kahan, supra note 3, at 369. See also Bebchuk, supra note 3, for the %iew that
the net balance would be to discourage more efficient transactions than inefficient ones. See
also Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 355-56, for the argument that current legal rules
over-reward minority shareholders, even without adopting an equal opportunity rule.
20See DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1995); see also Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hartnett, 564
A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) (rejecting minority discounts and entitling minority shareholders to a
proportionate share in value of the firm).
"See Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 87 N.Y.3d 161 (N.Y. 1995).
22Sometimes the disparity is alarming between what the minority receives in an
appraisal proceeding and what it receives in a WVeinberger-style action to enjoin the merger.
In Selfe v. Joseph, 501 A.2d 409 (Del. 1985), the attempt of the Royal Dutch Shell Group to
merge out the last 5.4% interest in Shell Oil Company was enjoined, and as a result the merger
price was raised from $58 to $60. See In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1216 (Del. 1992).
However, in the follow-up appraisal proceeding, those shareholders w~ho elected appraisal
received $71.20 per share plus interest. Id at 1215.
"See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases which disallow
minority discounts; see alsoCharles Murdock, The Evolution ofEffective Remediesfor Minori,
Shareholdersand lts Impact Upon ValuationofMinority Shares,65 NoTRE DAME L. RE%. 425,
473 (1989) (discussing state court views on minority discounts); Robert B. Heglar, Note,
Rejecting the Minority Discount, 1989 DuKE LJ. 258 (noting the trend in case law w~hich
rejects minority discounts).
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In principle, this rule could easily be generalized and extended to
the Weinbergerproceeding.24 Under Weinberger,Delaware courts permit
minority shareholders to challenge a squeeze-out merger when they allege
that they have been treated unfairly."
In such proceedings, the
controlling shareholder must demonstrate two elements: fair dealing and
fair price.26 Thus, as a doctrinal matter, it would be simple to equate
"fair value" in appraisal with "fair price" under Weinberger.2 7 If this
were done, a transaction in which a shareholder did not receive his or her
proportionate share in the existing value of the corporation would be
actionable both in a damages action and, in appropriate cases, by means
of injunction.
The assertion of such a'generalized rule, without more, will
encounter objections because it is both controversial and ambiguous.
First, it is controversial because the legitimacy of the control premium
implies to many the inevitability of compensating minority discounts.2
Second, ambiguity arises because the concept of proportionate value is
not self-defining. As a concept, proportionate value has fuzzy edges, and
ambiguity is costly because it exposes many transactions to attack under
an ill-defined standard.
Thus, any proposed answer must be relatively precise and must not
sweep overbroadly so as to discourage efficiency-promoting transactions.
Although the issue of the possible overbreadth of any proposed remedy
can be postponed, the assumed linkage between the control premium and
the minority discount must be faced at the outset because it is central to
whether efficiency-enhancing transactions will be discouraged. To
illustrate the problem, it is useful to begin with a simple example to
which this article will periodically return. Assume that a control acquirer,
who has paid a premium to the controlling shareholder, shortly thereafter
seeks to follow up its defacto acquisition of control with a squeeze-out
merger of the remaining shareholders. This acquisition will trigger the
appraisal statute in the corporation's jurisdiction of incorporation. To the
extent that there cannot be any minority discount in the appraisal court's
determination of "fair value," the ability of an acquirer to pay a control

24
Weinberger
25

v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
1d.
26
1d. at 711-15.
27

Today, the concept of"fair price" has been defined only in exceedingly general terms.
See infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text. Conversely, the term "fair value" is subject to
a special statutory limitation. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 262(h) (1995); In re Shell Oil, 607
A.2d at 1218. See also infra text and accompanying note 268 (discussing the fair value
requirement of DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 262(h)).
28See, e.g., Heglar, supra note 23, at 269.
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premium at the earlier first-step control acquisition stage seems at least
marginally restricted. Specifically, let us assume that the "intrinsic value"
of the corporation is $20 per share29 and that the new controlling
shareholder acquired a 50% controlling block by paying $30 per share for
this block.3" If the acquirer now seeks to use this 50% control block to
impose a squeeze-out merger on the minority stockholders, it logically
will wish to pay no more than $10 per share to the remaining minority
shareholders.3 1 Yet, if all minority shareholders were to exercise their
appraisal remedy, they could seemingly demand their proportionate share
in the firm's value, which is $20 per share. A judicial decision to award
$20 per share would in turn raise the average price per share for the
entire acquisition to an uneconomic $25 per share.
The point of this example is that any definition of the firm's "fair
value" in appraisal which seeks to award proportionate value seems
inconsistent with the payment of any significant control premium, unless
the acquirer anticipates significant synergiesfrom the acquisition that
justify paying a price greater than the firm's "intrinsicvahe" as a freestanding entity.
This last "unless" clause is critical because it separates a transaction
that creates wealth from one that merely transfers it. When an acquirer
is willing to pay a premium to some shareholders plus proportionate
value to the remainder, this willingness signifies that it views the
acquisition as a value-enhancing one.32 When the acquirer is not so
willing, the possibility surfaces that the acquisition may be simply a
wealth transferring one. For example, assume that the intrinsic value of
a hypothetical firm is still $20 per share, but that the acquirer is willing
to pay $30 per share for the first 50% and $20 per share for the
remaining 50%. In this case, the acquirer must anticipate that wealth will
be created as a result of the acquisition because it is paying an average
cost of $25 per share. But when the same acquirer offers $28 per share
for the first 50%, in the hopes of paying only $10 per share for the
remaining 50% in the same company, the same conclusion does not

29

For this purpose, assume also that this intrinsic value represents both the corporation's
"going concern" value and its liquidation value and excludes any synergistic gain that the
acquirer expects to realize by combining or consolidating the corporation with another firm or
business.
"In other words, the controlling shareholder received a 5004a control premium over the
$20 per share intrinsic value.
3
It would be willing to pay more than $10 per share only if it expects synergistic
benefits from the merger, in such a case, the firm will have a value to the acquirer greater than
its intrinsic value to its former shareholders.
32
See Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1484.
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necessarily follow. In this circumstance, it may only be seeking to
transfer wealth from the minority shareholders to itself.
Some will dismiss this argument as simply a "fairness" claim, but
it can be articulated equally as well in efficiency terms. To the extent
that the law permits uncompensated wealth transfers, the law creates
unproductive uncertainty and leaves the minority's property rights
inadequately defined. Thus, legal rules that permit such wealth transfers
are not only arguably unfair, but also inefficient because they increase
agency costs, chiefly by permitting managers and insiders to exploit
asymmetric information about the firm's value.
Part I of this article will evaluate the inventory of legal doctrines
by which courts review and regulate control transactions doctrines. Here,
the focus will be on the differing scope and potential utility of these
doctrines as a means by which to distinguish efficient from inefficient
transactions.
Part II will examine the likelihood of inefficient control transfers.
Based in part upon data which suggests that the stock prices of publicly
held corporations declines as a controlling block is assembled,33 this
article disagrees with the view advanced by some economists that fair
value should be defined simply in terms of the stock market price prior
to the announcement of the buyout.34 Indeed, it is insufficient for the
case law simply to reject minority discounts, as Delaware decisions have
clearly done, because the stock market price inherently builds a minority
discount into the corporation's stock price in some settings. Hence, an
unbiased estimator of firm value must be sought in those circumstances
where the structure of share ownership affects firm value. Part II will
also consider the economic arguments both for and against a
proportionate value standard.
Part III addresses the problems of implementation. Here, the key
issue is how to define proportionate value in settings where asymmetric
information is inherent. The proposed answer to this problem should be
familiar for the Delaware lawyer. When the use of asymmetric
information is unlikely, as in an arm's-length transaction between
unaffiliated parties, a strong presumption should favor the "fairness" of
the value approved by the board of directors. However, in cases
involving insiders seeking to take the firm private, the burden should be
on the insider to demonstrate that proportionate value has been offered.

33

See Karen Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value, 23 J. FIN. ECON.

3, 4 (1989). See also infra text and accompanying notes 196-207 for a discussion of the Wruck
study.
"See Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 3.
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Finally, Part III will consider what proportionate value should mean when

the potential for synergy leads insiders to seek to expel the public
shareholders.
In sum, this article does not seek to challenge the rule that a seller

may receive a control premium, but it does seek to focus on whether the
legitimacy of the control premium has any necessary corollary for the

valuation of minority shares.
PART I. THE BARRIERS TO CONTROL PREMIUMS

Few, if any, U.S. cases have held that control premiums could not

be paid. Rather, the disincentives to their payment have been implicit
and indirect. Among them, the following obstacles stand out:
A. The Williams Act and the Equal Opportunity Concept
1. Rule 14d-10
Promulgated by the SEC in 1986 under the Williams Act, Rule
14d-10 (Equal Treatment of Security Holders) codifies an incomplete
"equal opportunity" rule by requiring that a tender offer be "open to all
security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer."3 5
More importantly, this section specifies that "[t]he consideration paid to
any security holder pursuant to the tender offer is the highest
consideration paid to any other security holder during such tender
offer. '3 6 This latter obligation is known as the "best price rule," and it
has an express foundation in the Williams Act." Rule 14d-10 is also
collaterally supported by Rule lOb-13, which forbids purchases outside
the tender offer "from the time such tender offer ... is publicly
announced or otherwise made known ...until the expiration of the
period . .."" In effect, the Williams Act is read by the SEC to mean
that the bidder cannot buy outside the tender offer once it has begun,
must keep the tender offer open to all, and must pay the highest price
paid to any holder to all who tender.
At first glance, both rules seem easily avoidable because neither
prohibits a control purchase made days before the announcement, nor
".

"5See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1995). See generally Hazen, supra note 1, at 278-Si

(discussing § 240.14d-10).

3617 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1995).
3717 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1995).
3"See 17 C.F.R. §240.I0b-13 (1995).
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days after, the expiration of a tender offer. 9 However, the reach of Rule
14d-10 should not be underestimated because it may apply when an
apparently private transaction is made contingent on the consummation
of the tender offer. The best illustration of this potential reach is
supplied by a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Epstein v. MCA, InC.4 1 In
Epstein, the chief executive officer and chief operating officer of MCA,
Inc. each entered into special side deals just hours before the
announcement of a $6.1 billion tender offer by Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., Ltd. (Matsushita) for MCA, Inc. (MCA).4 ' Specifically,
Matsushita reached a separate agreement with MCA's chairman and chief
executive officer, Lew Wassermann, under which Wassermann would
exchange his MCA shares for preferred stock in a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Matsushita (MEA Holdings).42 Matsushita also agreed to
fund MEA Holdings by contributing 106% of the tender price paid to
other shareholders multiplied by the number of MCA shares Wassermann
exchanged.43 Under the terms of this agreement, Wassermann was
assured eventual redemption of his preferred stock 4 1 plus an attractive
dividend over the interim in a transaction that qualified as a tax-free
reorganization."

"See, e.g., Kahn v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 13 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994) (holding that Rule 14d-10 does not reach purchases made two days
before the announcement of the tender offer); Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to integrate purchases made hours after the cancellation of a tender
offer).
4050 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'don other grounds, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996); see also Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 943-46 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989) (rejecting defendants' contention that the transaction
amounted to two separate tender offers rather than an integrated single offer where the bidder
called off its tender offer and later reinstated it).
4"Epstein, 50 F.3d at 647.
421d. at 647-48 & n.2.
4Id. at 648.
4
1d. The MEA shares were also made redeemable on the death of Wassermann or his
wife, but in no event earlier than five years after the date of exchange. Id.
45Epstein, 50 F.3d at 648. Unlike Wassermann, the other shareholders sold their stock
to Matsushita for cash in a taxable transaction. Id. Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's chief operating
officer, was also involved in deals similar to that of Wassermann. Id. Pursuant to Matsushita's
$71 per share offer, Sheinberg received $83,754,085. Id. Upon Matsushita's accepting the
shares, Sheinberg received an additional $21 million for unexercised stock options. Epstein,
50 F.3d at 648.
Following the Wassermann and Sheinberg transactions, former MCA shareholders filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that
Matsushita violated SEC Rule 14d-10 by treating Wassermann and Sheinberg differently than
the other shareholders in the tender offer. Id. In deciding whether Rule 14d-10 was violated,
the court, on appeal, had to consider whether Wassermann received greater consideration than
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Not only was this side deal entered into on the morning of the
announcement of Matsushita's tender offer, but it was scheduled to close
(and did close) minutes after Matsushita accepted the shares tendered in
its tender offer.4 6 More importantly, both sides conditioned their
obligations to perform on the consummation of the offer.4
In this
manner, Wassermann got the benefit of the "best price" in the tender
offer because he would automatically free-ride on any price improvement
made by Matsushita to its tender offer.48 In turn, Matsushita avoided
making a large and illiquid investment in MCA if it failed to gain control.
Finally, Wassermann obtained special tax benefits that would not have
been available if he had received the same cash consideration as the other

shareholders.
Despite the clearly interwoven relationship between the
Wassermann transaction and the public tender offer, Matsushita argued
that Rule 14d-10's prohibitions end the moment that the bidder accepts
the tendered shares.49 The Ninth Circuit panel rejected this rigid time
frame,"0 but proposed a counter-theory that is potentially open-ended: "If
the plaintiff-shareholders or consideration which was never offered to the plaintiffs. Id. at 654.
iIdat 653.

"Id.
at 653-56. The agreement between Wassermann and Matsushita was conditioned
on four factors. First, neither party was obligated to perform if any of the terms of the tender

offer failed. Id. at 653. Second, the Wassermann deal was required to occur "immediately
following" acceptance of the tender offer. Id. Third, the amount Matsushita was to contribute
to MEA Holdings was conditioned on the tender price. Id. Fourth, the redemption value of
Wassermann's preferred stock was required to be equivalent to the tender price. Epstein, 50
F.3d at 653.
4
For example, this would occur if a rival bidder made a higher offer. The redemption
value was set at the tender price. Thus, if Matsushita were forced to improve its tender offer,
it would also have to improve its redemption price and its funding of the MEA Holdings
preferred stock. Id at 653.
49Epstein, 50 F.3d at 654. Focusing on timing, Matsushita argued that the Wassermann
deal fell beyond the reach of Rule 14d-10 because it "closed after the tender offer expired."
Id
"Id.The court rejected Matsushita's argument, finding that Rule 14d-10, like other
securities laws, does not dictate a rigid timing requirement. Id. Aside from finding that the
text of 14d-10 lacked any reference to timing, the court also noted that the history of the rule
negated any timing arguments. Idat 655. In reviewing the history of the rule, the court found
its focus to be the "equality of treatment" among shareholders and not the timing of the actual
transaction. Id

We therefore reject Matsushita's timing argument. Indeed, if adopted, it
would drain Rule 14d-10 of all its force. Under Matsushita's reading, even
the most blatantly discriminatory tender offer - in which large shareholders
were paid twice as much as small shareholders - would fall outside Rule

14d-10's prohibition, so long as the bidder waited a few seconds after it
accepted all of the tendered shares before paying the favored shareholders...

[Rule 14d-10] cannot be so easily circumvented.
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an ostensibly private agreement that pays a particular shareholder a sum
greater than the tender price is deemed a part of the tender offer, the
tender offer does not end, by definition, until that agreement is
performed."'"
After Epstein, the operative question becomes whether the private
"transaction was an integral part of [the]... tender offer". 2 The Epstein
court adopted a functional test to answer this question. Although the
court stated it would clearly be overbroad to assert simply that "a private
purchase of stock and a public tender offer are both part of a single plan
of acquisition,"5 3 purchases that are conditioned on the success of the
offer or that are automatically enhanced by increases in the tender offer
price do seem likely to be integrated with the tender offer under Epstein.
For the control seeker, Epstein implies that attempts to make conditional
purchases in order to avoid the danger of acquiring a large and illiquid
investment without control are fraught with danger because they may
violate Rule 14d-10.
On a policy level, however, there seems to be nothing inherently
objectionable about the bidder's goal of avoiding an illiquid,
noncontrolling investment. The tender offer is, itself, a mechanism
designed to confer precisely this protection against acquiring only a
noncontrolling block because the bidder can always specify a minimum
tender condition in its offer. Although the bidder probably could have
protected itself by other means,54 it is possible that future persons in the
position of Mr. Wassermann would be unwilling to accept the transaction,
except on a contingent and tax-free basis. To this extent, economists

Id. Thus, the court's analysis focused on whether the Wassermann agreement was an "integral
part" of the primary tender offer. Id.
"Id. at 656 n.19.
111d. at 655.
"3Epstein, 50 F.3d at 656. In formulating its rationale, the court noted that stock
transactions which occur before or after a tender offer do not violate Rule 14d-10 "provided
that all material terms of [such a] transaction stand independent of the tender offer." Id. See
also Kahn v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 13 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1834 (1994) (holding that Rule 14d-10 was not violated by a bidder's unconditional private
purchase of target's shares two days prior to the announcement of tender offer). Other
decisions have also refused to integrate pre- and post-tender offer private purchases with the
tender offer. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc. 937 F.2d 767, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1991); Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
"4Forexample, Matsushita could have purchased an option on Wassermann's stock, thus
enabling it to avoid any stock purchase if its tender offer was unsuccessful. The option price
could have been set sufficiently high as to assure Wassermann an attractive return, even if
Matsushita did not exercise the option.
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would argue that all shareholders, as well as economic efficiency, suffer
because Rule 14d-10 precludes price discrimination among shareholders.
Although this criticism goes to the heart of Rule 14d-10 and, if
accepted, implies that an equal opportunity rule would be undesirable, it
affords a policy justification for closely construing the rule and holding
it to precise time limits. In a post-Epstein case, the Seventh Circuit, in
a decision written by Judge Frank Easterbrook, has done exactly this.5"
In Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co.,56 the plaintiffs claimed that payments made
to a controlling shareholder of the target company, ostensibly in
connection with the modification of a distributorship agreement, actually
constituted consideration received by the controlling shareholder." This
transaction fell within Rule 14d-10, thus allowing other shareholders to
become entitled to an equal amount from the bidder.58 Although factual
distinctions were obvious that suggested that the payments were not made
pursuant to the tender offer, but were a substitute for the controlling
shareholder's rights under an exclusive distributorship agreement, the
district court found it easier to assume, for purposes of a motion to
dismiss, that the disputed payments were made for the controlling
shareholder's shares.59 Even in this event, it said, the case still had to be
dismissed "because the Distributor Agreement had been signed before the
tender offer began and therefore fell outside Rule 14d-10(a)(2), which
requires only that the bidder pay every tendering investor the 'highest
consideration paid to any other security holder during such tender
offer."' 60 Agreeing with the district court's analysis, Judge Easterbrook
provided a policy justification for it:
Purchases near in time to a tender offer, but outside it, may
be essential to transactions that all investors find beneficial.
Controlling shareholders often receive- indirect or nonmonetary benefits and are unwilling to part with their stock
(and hence with control) for a price that outside investors
find attractive. At the same time, potential bidders may be
unable to profit by paying everyone the price essential to
separate the insiders from their shares. . . . Treating the
Williams Act as a mandate for an identical price across the
55

See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1996).

'84 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id at 240.
9Id at 241.

"'Quaker Oals, 84 F.2dat241 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1995) (emphasis
added)).
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board - as opposed to an identical price for all shares
acquired
in the offer - would make all investors worse
1
6

off.

Based on this rationale, an equal opportunity rule never makes
sense, and, even as so confined, Rule 14d-10 seems undesirable. But
even Judge Easterbrook would apparently impose some limits:
Doubtless there are limits to the use of a follow-up merger as a
means to deliver extra compensation. Suppose Quaker Oats had
promised [the controlling shareholder] $14 for each share he
tendered during the offer, plus another $6 for each of these shares
one month later. Just as tax law requires 'boot' to be treated as a
gain received from the sale of stock, securities law treats 'boot' as
a payment during the tender offer.6"
This exception for "boot" creates ambiguities even under the Seventh
Circuit's narrow construction of Rule 14d-10. Potentially, modifications
to stock options, agreements relating to golden parachutes, or incentive
compensation could fall within it if the agreement is reached during the
pendency of the tender offer.
Ultimately, the tension between Epstein and Quaker Oats not only
frames a central policy issue (i.e., the desirability of an equal opportunity
rule), but also reveals the potential vulnerability of the existing sale of
control doctrine. A modest enlargement in the definition of "tender offer"
could overwhelm the existing doctrine by allowing Rule 14d- 10 to sweep
earlier or subsequent private purchases within its "best price" rule. At
several points in the past, such broader definitions of "tender offer" have
come close to adoption by the SEC.63
61

d. at 243. Judge Easterbrook gives an example under which the firm's stock is

trading for $20 and insiders who hold 30% would not sell for less than $30, while the bidder
believes the entire firm is worth $25 per share. Id. On these facts, he opines that "if the
acquirer could pay $30 to the control group before the bid commences and acquire the rest of
the stock at $22 per share, for an average price of $24.40 ... [e]veryone is better off." Id.
Ignored by this example is the possibility that the insider's claimed refusal to sell for less than
$30 was 2feigned or that proportionate value was greater than $22 per share.
6 Lerro, 84 F.3d at 245.
"Harold Williams, an SEC chairman, suggested that an acquisition of 10% of a class
of equity securities should be defined as a tender offer. See Letter of Harold M. Williams,
Chairman of Securities Exchange Commission, to Senator William Proxmire, reprinted in
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,453 (Feb. 14, 1980). Two years
later, the SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers recommended a 20% threshold at which
closely connected purchases would be deemed a tender offer. See Statement ofJohn S.R. Shad,
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2. Rule 13e-3

The Williams Act's preference for an equal opportunity rule is
even more evident in the "going private" rules that the SEC has adopted
under section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.64
Essentially, Rule 13e-3 creates a strong disincentive to paying control
premiums when the acquirers intend to follow up such purchases and
acquire the remaining shares. This is achieved by carving out an
exemption from its rigorous disclosure requirements for a two-step tender
offer and follow-up merger transaction in which the acquirer agrees at the
outset to pay the same price in the follow-up merger as it paid in the
front-end tender offer. Specifically, this exception requires that both

Chairman of SEC, before Hearings ofthe House Committee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection & Finance Concerning Recommendations of the SEC Advisory Committee on
Tender Offers, [1984 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,511, at 86,679 (Mar. 28,
1984).
'See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e (1995). Rule 13e provides:
When a person other than the issuer makes a tender offer for, or request or
invitation for tenders of, any class of equity securities of an issuer subject to
section 13(e) of the Act, and such person has filed a statement with the
Commission pursuant to § 240.14d-1 and the issuer has received notice
thereof, such issuer shall not thereafter, during the period such tender offer,
request or invitation continues, purchase any equity securities of which it is
the issuer unless it has complied with both of the following conditions:
(a)
The issuer filed with the Commission eight copies of a statement
containing the information specified below with respect to the proposed
purchases:
(1)
The title and amount of securities to be purchased, the names of the
persons or classes of persons from whom, and the market in which, the
securities are to be purchased, including the name of any exchange on w~hich
the purchase is to be made;
(3)
The source and amount of funds or other consideration used or to bused in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price or
proposed purchase price is represented by funds or other consideration
borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or
trading the securities, a description of the transaction and the names of the
parties thereto; and
(b)
The initial statement shall be accompanied by a fee payable to the
Commission as required by § 240.0-11.
(c)
The issuer has at any time within the past 6 months sent or given to
its equity security holders the substance of the information contained in the
statement required by paragraph (a) of this section: Provided,however, That
any issuer making such purchases which commenced prior to July 30, 1968
shall, if such purchases continue after such date, comply with the provisions
of this rule or before August 12, 1968.
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steps be affected on the same or "substantially similar" terms pursuant to
a preannounced plan and within a prescribed one year time period.6 In
effect, the control seeker is given a choice: (1) offer all shareholders the
same terms from the outset and effect both steps within one year, or (2)
pay a control premium and accept costly and intrusive governmental
regulation as well as potential liability for disclosure violations.6 6
Viewed from a policy perspective, the SEC's preference for
equality has one serious drawback. Although its rules have great
potential bite, they do not begin to frame a standard that distinguishes
efficient transactions from inefficient ones. This is clearest in the Epstein
case, where the financial liability was potentially significant, but the
transaction seemed an efficiency promoting one in which a foreign
acquirer would take over and recapitalize a declining U.S. firm.67 The
SEC's premise seems not to be that it was blocking inefficient
transactions, but that it was blocking none because the bidder does not
need to price discriminate. Although this is debatable, the SEC's "equal
opportunity" rules clearly do not perform the triggering function
contemplated by Professor Elhauge."8 At most, its rules only discourage
unequal sharing of the control premium in cases where the efficiency
gains from unequal sharing would be modest.
B. Control Seller Liability: Still Alive But Flickering
Despite the general rule that a controlling shareholder is free to sell
at a premium not available to the other shareholders, there remains a
miscellaneous assortment of instances in which sellers who receive a
control premium can be held liable. Most fall under the following
headings:
1. Sales to "Looters"
The classic exception to the general rule arises when the seller had
reason to suspect that its buyer planned to "loot" the company.69
6"17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g) (outlining the exceptions to Rule 13e-3).

"Id. Of course, it is possible to make privately negotiated control purchases in
advance of the tender offer at a premium when appropriate, full disclosure occurs. However,
it remains uncertain whether the staff would seek to deny the availability of Rule 13e-3(g) in
such a case.
6'See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995), rev 'don other grounds, 116

S. Ct. 873 (1996); see also supra notes 40-54 (discussing the Epstein case).
"See Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1523-32 (discussing the triggering theory).
6'See, e.g., DeBraun v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. Ct. App.
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Delaware law has long used a "reasonable suspicion" standard, which is
triggered by the "existence of facts that would give rise to suspicion by
a reasonably prudent person. "" In short, actual knowledge of an
improper purpose is not required, but the duty of care that a controlling
shareholder must observe can apparently be "breached only by grossly
negligent conduct."'
2. Sales of Office
If the seller holds a block too small to carry control by itself and
receives an obvious control premium, courts may infer that the seller has
actually sold a corporate office, which is impermissible conduct for a
fiduciary."
The result is an uncertain body of law that seeks to
determine when the seller holds defacto "working control" by virtue of

1975) (holding that a majority shareholder has a duty of due care and reasonable investigation
when a control purchaser intends to loot the corporation). For a review of the case law
regarding looting, see Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1467-68; Hamilton, supra note 1,at 263 &
n.37; F. Hodge O'Neal, Sale of a Controlling CorporateInterest: Bases of PossibleSeller
Liability, 38 U. Prrr. L. REV. 9, 16-23 (1976).
7
See Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 233-34 (Del. Ch. 1990) (discussing the seller's
duty to the corporation in control sales where looting occurs).
71Id. at 236.
'See, e.g., In re Caplan, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div.), a/I'd, 198 N.E.2d 908
(N.Y. 1964) (stating that "the management of a corporation is not the subject of trade and
cannot be bought apart from actual stock control"); see also CLARK, supranote I, at 480-81
(discussing the sale of office concept); Alfred Hill, The Sale of ControllingShares,70 HARv.
L. REv. 986, 997-98 & n.33 (1956-1957) (stating that "[i]n situations where officers and
directors have made a sale of particular jobs or of the machinery of control unaccompanied by
the sale of shares.., the courts have uniformly held the sellers accountable for the sums
received"). Although sales of office are "per se illegal," courts allow control sellers to install
the control buyer's nominees into corporate positions as part of the sale agreement. Elhauge,
supra note 4, at 1469. Since the buyer would ultimately be allowed to vote in his nominees,
regulation of such really serves no purpose and deters control sales. Id. at 1469-70. However,
this rule is problematic because it is difficult to determine what percentage of the stock
constitutes a control block. Id at 1470. Aside from the "working control" rule applied in Nec
York, other courts require that the control block sold represent over 50% of the voting stock
in order for the transaction to be valid. Id Both of the tests are plagued by advantages and
disadvantages. Proponents of the latter test argue that the existence of working control is both
difficult and costly to establish. Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1469. However, the 'wholb
preclusive nature of the latter rules for buyers with less than 50% can be just as costly as the
working control rule. Id. These buyers would now have to pay for a special or wait for an
annual meeting to purchase control while also risking noncontrol for some time. Id.
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its stock ownership.7" New York courts have found the seller of a 3%
block liable,74 yet wavered at 9.7%.75

3. "Constructive Looting": Diversions of Business Opportunities
and Nonprofit Maximizing Behavior
The hardest group of cases to classify are those in which the seller
had reason to know that its buyer would run the business in a manner
that would thereafter be less profitable to the noncontrolling
shareholders.76 The best known example of this category is Perlman v.
Feldmann,77 in which a controlling shareholder of a steel manufacturer
sold his block to a consortium of steel users who appeared to have been
seeking a captive source of supply during a period of acute scarcity
caused by the Korean War.78 Although the company was subject to
wartime price controls, the controlling seller, who was also the CEO, had
effectively evaded them by demanding interest-free loans from his
customers.7 9 Finding that the control seller had sold "for personal gain
corporate advantages to be derived from a favorable market situation,"8"

73
See Essex Universal v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 577 (2d Cir. 1962) (applying the
working control rule in sales ofoffice). See also Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1469-73 (discussing
sales of74office as an "amorphous" exception to the equal sharing rule).
See, e.g., In re Caplan, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
"See, e.g., Carter v. Muscat, 251 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (noting that a
stable percentage of stock is not "continuously[ ]sufficient to maintain control," even if it had
been deemed sufficient for many years prior).
7"See Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1473-80 (discussing the diverted business opportunity
exception).
77219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
7"Id. at 174-75. C. Russell Feldmann, the principal defendant, was both the president
and chairman of the board of Newport Steel Corporation. Id. at 174. The derivative suit in
this case arose out of the sale of Newport stock to the Wilport Company. Id at 175. The
plaintiffs, who were minority shareholders of Newport, argued that the sale of their interest
resulted in illegal gains for the defendants. Id. at 174-75. The alleged illegal gains were
caused by the inclusion of a corporate asset in the purchase price of the stock. Id. at 174-75.
Essentially, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants needed to account to the
"nonparticipating" shareholders for their shares of the profits that were derived from the
corporate asset. Id. at 175.
7"Id. at 177. The controlling seller of the stock was also the company's CEO. Id.
"Ild. at 176.
We do not mean to suggest that a majority stockholder cannot dispose of his
controlling block of stock to outsiders without having to account to his
corporation for profits or even never do this with impunity when the buyer is
an interested customer, actual or potential, for the corporation's product. But
when the sale necessarily results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate
good will and consequent unusual profit to the fiduciary who has caused the
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the Second Circuit held that the seller must share the control premium he
had received with the minority shareholders.

Perlman has long been the darling of the law school nursery,
because it involves a host of collateral issues."

Despite its appeal for

academics, there remains considerable doubt that Pernman would be

followed today. 2 At the least, it seems questionable that a court would

hold a control seller to a negligence standard. Instead, a court might
require some standard of scienter approaching actual knowledge, at which
point the seller could be seen as an aider and abetter in the buyer's
intended fiduciary abuse.
4. Diverted Offers

Another traditional category which has divided the courts involves
offers that were originally made to the corporation, but which the
controlling shareholder converts into an offer for its own shares.83 For
example, a corporate acquirer might offer either to buy a crown jewel
asset or to merge with the target corporation, at the same premium to all

shareholders. In response, the controlling shareholder might substitute its
own proposal to sell only its own shares, thereby diverting the premium
to itself. Some cases have found a breach of fiduciary duty on these
facts,84 while others have not.8 5
sacrifice, he should account for his gains. So in a time of a market shortage,
where a call on a corporation's product commands an unusually large
premium, in one form or another, we think it is sound law that a fiduciary
may not appropriate to himself the value of this premium.
Id at 178.
"'For example, should the measure of damages be the noncontralling shareholders'
proportionate share of the premium or the foreseeable loss that the seller caused the
corporation?
"See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 715-19; Elhauge, supranote 4, at 147475 (discussing Perlman critically). See also Andres, supra note 1, at 505 (discussing the
Perlman decision in the context of his proposed equal opportunity rule).
"See Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1475.
'See Brown v. Halbert, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that a majority
stockholder has a duty to fully disclose all aspects of a sale of the majority stock vhere the
price is unavailable to the other stockholders); Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer,
76 A. 77, 79 (Pa. 1910) (stating that "the mere fact that the means used to accomplish the
unlawful end would, if standing alone, be lawful in themselves will not save such officer from
responsibility to account for profits thus made by him which otherwise might have gone into
the coffers of his corporation").
"See, e.g., Tyron v. Smith, 229 P.2d 251 (Or. 1951) (holding that the majority,
although directors, can sell their stock for any price without disclosing to the other stockholders
the terms of the sale, so long as they act in good faith). See also Treadvay Cos. v. Care Corp.,
638 F.2d 357, 375-78 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that a director has no duty to promote the
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The Delaware law on this issue seems particularly complicated.

This complexity is illustrated by a series of recent Delaware decisions in

the Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc.86 litigation. In the CERBCO cases, plaintiffs
sought to enjoin Robert and George Erikson, two controlling
shareholders, from selling their controlling stock in CERBCO, Inc.87 at
a 700% premium over the market price of CERBCO's publicly traded
stock. 8 Plaintiffs alleged that the buyer had initially sought not to
acquire control of CERBCO, but to buy CERBCO's stock in a partiallyowned subsidiary, Insituform East, Inc. (East), which CERBCO
controlled. 9 The Eriksons allegedly responded by offering their own

control block in CERBCO for sale.9" Although this planned sale by the
Eriksons was abandoned, plaintiffs still pursued the case, alleging that the
defendants had caused CERBCO to sacrifice a lucrative corporate
opportunity by seeking to convert a corporate sale of its East stock into
a personal sale by the Eriksons of their own CERBCO stock.9

interests of all shareholders in its transactions with third parties nor does it need to account to
the other shareholders for profits derived from such dealings).
"No. 345, 1995, 1996 Del. LEXIS 144 (Del. Apr. 10, 1996), affd in part, rev'd in
part Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., No. 11,713, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 257 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29,
1993), reprinted in 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 942 (1994), reh g denied, Thorpe by Castleman v.
CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996). For the earlier and lengthy history of this case, see
Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 611 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1991) (denying motion to dismiss); Thorpe
v. CERBCO,Inc., No. 11,713, [1993-1993 TransferBinder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,447
(Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 1993), reprintedin 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1196 (1993) (granting motion for
partial summary judgment); Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., No. 11,713, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 257
(Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 1993), reprintedin 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 942 (1994). Eventually, the case
was dismissed after trial. Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., No. 11,713, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 96
(Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1995), reprintedin 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 339 (1996), rev'd in part, affd In
part, No.7345, 1995, 1996 Del. LEXIS 144 (Del. Apr. 10, 1996).
' CERBCO, 611 A.2d at 8. The Eriksons served as directors of CERBCO as well as
majority stockholders. Id. Prior to the institution of this litigation, the following facts
occurred. In 1982, CERBCO underwent recapitalization, creating Class A and B common
stock. Id. at 7. The Class B stock was convertible and had greater voting power than the Class
A stock. Id. Although the recapitalization did not actually increase the Eriksons' control over
CERBCO, it did increase their ownership of Class B stock to 80%. CERBCO, 611 A.2d at 7.
88CERBCO, No. 11,713, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,447, at 96,493, reprinted in 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1198.
89
CERBCO, 611 A.2d at 7-8. In 1985, CERBCO gained control of Insituform East.
Id. at 7. Insituform also recapitalized, creating Class B common stock. Id. at 8. In 1990, the
Eriksons agreed to sell their Class B stock for $24.24 per share. Id. However, the market
value for this stock remained at $3 per share. CERBCO, 611 A.2d at 8. As a result of this
transaction, the shareholder plaintiffs sued the Eriksons alleging that they breached their
fiduciary duty by directing a corporate opportunity which belonged to CERBCO. Id.
901d. at 8.
91CERBCO, No. 11,713, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 257, at *10, reprinted in 19 DEL. J.
CORP. L. at 955.
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Ultimately, Chancellor Allen found, and the Delaware Supreme
Court agreed, that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties as
CERBCO directors in their handling of the corporate opportunity. 92
However, Chancellor Allen further found that this breach of duty "neither
caused any injury to CERBCO nor resulted in no substantial gain to the
defendants."9" Because the sale of East would have required shareholder
approval as a sale of substantially all CERBCO's assets, Chancellor Allen
concluded that the Eriksons, voting as shareholders, could have
permissibly blocked it.94
Alternatively, Chancellor Allen reasoned that the defendants' power
to sell their shares at a premium "afforded" them "with a veto power over
[the] ways in which CERBCO itself might satisfy [the buyer's] business
purpose."' This latter articulation is ambiguous and, in the view of the
Delaware Supreme Court, came perilously close to treating the "right to
pursue a control premium... [as absolving defendants] from any liability
for the breach of fiduciary duty in the process."9" Finding this too broad
a proposition to accept, it partially reversed Chancellor Allen, agreeing
with him that the defendants could act in their own self-interest by voting
to block the sale, but still finding that damages could be awarded for their
must
breach of fiduciary duty and further ruling that the defendants
97
"disgorge any benefits emanating from ... that breach.1
At a minimum, Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc. suggests that a controlling
shareholder's right to veto desirable corporate transactions is not
unlimited and does not "supersede the duty of loyalty owned by control
persons.""8 The net effect is uncertain, because although Delaware
directors must make full disclosure under CERBCO, controlling
.shareholders can still seemingly act to block a lucrative transaction for
self-interested reasons.

92CERBCO, No. 345, 1995, 1996 Del. LEXIS 144, at *3.
"CERBCO, No. 11,713, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 96, at *3, reprintedin 21 DEL. J.CORP.
L. at 342.
941d. at *4,reprintedin 21 DEL. J. COip. L. at 342. Even in the plaintiffs' estimation,
CERBCO's East stock "constituted 68% of CERBCO's 1990 assets" and so represented a sale
of substantially all its assets. Id. at *32-33, reprintedin 21 DEL. J.CORP. L. at 355. Thus,
under § 271, shareholder approval was required for this sale of substantially all the finn's
assets. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1995).
95CERBCO, No. 11,713, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 96, at *5, reprintedin 21 DEL J. CORP.
L. at 342.
-CERBCO, No. 345, 1995, 1996 Del. LEXIS 144, at *8.
"Id. at *3.
9id. at *9.
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5. Discrimination
In virtually every, U.S. jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that shares of the
same class must be treated equally in the payment of dividends or in the
distribution of assets on liquidation, absent a contrary agreement or
charter provision.99 Normally, this rule is not a barrier to the payment of
a control premium because it applies only to the corporation, itself, while
the control premium is paid by the control purchaser who is typically not
a fiduciary to the other shareholders. Yet, cases can arise in which the
corporation becomes so involved in the payment of the premium that its
own conduct arguably violates the principle of equality among shares of
the same class. The best illustration of this is a New York case,
Beaumont v. American Can Co. °° American Can entered into a
memorandum of intent to merge with Associated Madison Companies,
Inc. (Madison).'0 ' Under the intended agreement, forty-five percent of
the Madison shares would receive cash, while the remainder would
receive securities of American Can. 2 After signing this agreement,
American Can bought thirty-four percent of Madison's common stock
from five institutional investors at $15 per share. 3 American Can then
issued its own shares, valued at $12.61, in exchange for the vast majority
of the publicly held shares.'
Finding this differential to amount to
discrimination against the public shareholders, the New York court found
that the minority shareholders were also entitled to receive the higher $15
price. 5
The key to this possibly surprising decision seems to have been
that the target corporation (Madison) knew that the amount of cash
consideration to be paid by the acquirer was limited. 0 6 Thus, by entering
into the memorandum agreement, it participated in the disproportionate
allocation of the merger premium to certain favored shareholders.'0 7 In

9
See In re Sea-Land Corp., 642 A.2d 792, 800 n.10 (Del. Ch. 1993) (stating that "all
shares of the same type, series, or class are, by definition, equal"); Bank of N.Y. Co. v. Irving
Bank Corp., 536 N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (N.Y. 1988) (noting that all shares within the same class
are equal); see also I ERNEST L. FOLK, III ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW
§ 151.3, at 151:13 (Supp. 1995) (noting that "stockholders have the right to share in the profits
of the company and in the distribution of its assets on liquidation").
0538 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. 1988).
I1d. at 137.
2
O
1d
10 31d.
'°'Beaumont, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
1051d.

106Id.
7
1O

1d.
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effect, the court saw the facts as if the acquirer gave the cash to the target
corporation, which then selectively distributed it among its own
shareholders. The practical lesson of Beaumont is not to involve the
corporation in the allocation of any premiums to only some of its
shareholders.
Beaumont also suggests that corporations should be disallowed

from formally approving or acquiescing in such a procedure.

For

practitioners, the problem with the decision is the uncertainty it creates
about when mere knowledge by the issuer corporation will be deemed
sufficient acquiescence or involvement in the acquirer's conduct so as to
trigger Beaumont's severe rule. Without explicitly rejecting Beaumont,
Delaware courts have distinguished its facts and expressed skepticism
about its application outside New York.'
C. AppraisalRights
Typically, an acquirer of a controlling block will follow up its firststep acquisition with a squeeze-out merger, usually for cash.", Under
Delaware law, such an acquisition will normally trigger appraisal rights."o

'"See,e.g., Priddy v. Edelman, 679 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. Mich. 1988), affd, 883 F.2d
438 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying Delaware law and holding that a stockholder does not have a
fiduciary duty to the corporation unless it is the controlling stockholder); In re Sea-Land,642
A.2d at 800-01 (distinguishing the Beaumont case and holding that the fiduciary duty of cqual
treatment is not breached by a disparate agreement unless the board approves it). In Thorpe
v. CERBCO, Inc., No. 11,713, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 257 (Del. Ch. OcL 29, 1993), reprinted
in 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 942 (1994), Chancellor Allen reversed his own prior determination and
found that the use of corporate processes to facilitate the sale of control stock was not
improper, even though the controlling stockholders breached their fiduciary duty of loyalt by
failing to disclose the offer to the board. Id. at *24-39, reprintedin 19 DEL. J. CoRP. L. at
953-64. Although this decision seems in considerable tension with Beaumont, its continuing
force seems questionable in light of the Delaware Supreme Court's remand of the case on other
grounds. See Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., No. 345, 1995, 1996 Del. LEXIS 144 (Del. Apr. 10,
1996). Indeed, use of corporate processes for personal purposes seems in serious conflict with
the Delaware Supreme Court's rationale in Thorpe.
""See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 723-33 (discussing freeze-out mergers).
"'See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991 & Supp. 1992). The "market exception"
in § 262(b)(2) vill not apply in such a case, unless the consideration paid the minority consists
of shares in another corporation. If the consideration is cash or debt securities or privately
traded stock, the dissenters will be entitled to appraisal.
An appraisal proceeding "isintended to provide shareholders wvho dissent from a
merger, on the basis of inadequacy of the offering price, with a judicial determination of the
fair value of their shares." CavalierOil, 564 A.2d at 1142 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988); Weinberger,457 A.2d at 714). See also Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 1, at 722 (discussing appraisal in the context of freezeouts and case law
which accompanies this subject); Angie Woo, Appraisal Rights in Mergers of Publicly-Held
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More importantly, leading Delaware precedent indicates that in appraisal
proceedings, minority shareholders should receive their "proportionate

interest" in the corporation without any deduction for minority
discounts."' The Delaware Supreme Court made this point emphatically
in Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,'2 where it wrote:
The application of a discount to a minority shareholder is
contrary to the requirement that the company be viewed as
a "going concern" . ...More important, to fail to accord to
a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his
shares imposes a penalty for lack of control, and unfairly
enriches the majority shareholders, who may reap a windfall
from the appraisal process ...

DelawareCorporations:SomethingOld,SomethingNew, SomethingBorrowed,andSomelting
B.L.U.E., 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 719 (1995) (discussing the appraisal remedy in Delaware).
"'See, e.g., Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144-45 (rejecting minority discounts in
valuation during appraisal proceedings); Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del.
1950) (stating that a "stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is... the
true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger"). See also Heglar.
supra note 23, at 266-80 (arguing that the minority discount is repugnant to the appraisal
remedy's goals of fulfilling expectations and protecting against unfairness).
...
564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989). Prior to this case, much litigation and factual history
surrounded the parties' relationship. William J.Hartnett, Tom J.Billman, and Clayton C.
McCuistion were investors on Equity Programs Investment Corporation (EPIC), which
purchased model homes from builders for "lease-back purposes." Id. at 1139. A variety of
subsidiaries emerged from EPIC, including EPIC Mortgage, Inc. (EMI), which serviced the
mortgages on all EPIC's properties. Id. In 1983, Community Savings and Loan, Inc. (CSL)
merged with EMI. Id. CSL was controlled by McCuistion and Billman, Cavalier Oil, 564
A.2d at 1139. Hartnett was offered nonconvertible, nonvoting preferred CSL shares in
exchange for his stock; however, he refused this offer. Id. at 1140. During negotiations with
Hartnett, Billman and McCuistion effected an agreement between EMI and another EPIC
subsidiary, EPIC Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (EMSI). Id. EMI agreed to perform EMSI's
business, gaining considerable EMSI profit. Id. In 1984, EMSI merged with Cavalier Oil
Corporation. Id. Hartnett rejected Cavalier's offer, choosing instead to assert his appraisal
rights, which resulted in the decision that is discussed. Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1139.
"'Id.at 1145 (emphasis added). Hartnett's claims centered on the value assigned to
his shares, not the actual validity of the merger. Id. at 1143. On appeal, Cavalier argued that
the chancery court erred by excluding a minority discount from the value of Hartnett's EMSI
stock. Id. at 1144. Cavalier asserted that Hartnett's de minimis 1.5% interest should be
included when valuing his stock. Id. In determining the fair value of a dissenter's shares, the
court applied the test derived in Weinberger, which allows consideration of "all relevant
factors." CavalierOil, 564 A.2d at 1142-43. This analysis has specifically narrowed the test
to focus on both fair dealing and fair price. Id. at 1144. However, prior to determining the
shareholder's "proportionate interest," the court must first determine the value of the
corporation as an "operating entity." Id. Referring to the chaieery court, the court noted that
the objective of appraisal is to "value the corporationitself, as distinguished from a specific
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But what exactly is the "windfall" that the court has in mind in
Cavalier Oil? From the context in which the phrase is used, it seems
evident that the Delaware Supreme Court believed that if minority
shareholders receive less than their proportionate interest in the company,
valued as a going concern, then the majority shareholder will receive an
illicit "windfall.""' 4 But to say this, implies that an acquirer who pays a
control premium is not entitled to fully realize it. That is, the controlling
shareholder can exercise the power and prerogatives that accompany de
facto 'control, but cannot force the minority shareholder to accept a
compensating discount in appraisal, even though the market might trade
the minority's shares at such a discount. This view treats the control
premium as a privilege, not a right. Essentially, the control premium
becomes something one can pay or receive, but without any corollary that
the minority's shares are thereby legally affected. The incentives created
by such an approach are analyzed in Part II.
D. Entire Fairness: The ContinuingAvailability
of RescissionaryRelief
Under Delaware law, the appraisal remedy is not exclusive when
a controlling shareholder seeks to squeeze-out the remaining minority
shareholders in a merger. Since the 1983 decision in Weinberger it
UOP, Inc.," 5 Delaware decisions have recognized that the controlling
shareholder must bear the burden of proving the "entire fairness" of such
a transaction." 6 If, however, the terms of a squeeze-out merger are
negotiated by an independent committee, it is well settled that the
plaintiffs face the formidable burden of proving the substantive unfairness
of the transaction."'
In 1994, this perception of the plaintiff's burden was dramatically
changed by the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Kahn it Lynch
fraction of its shares as they may exist in the hands of a particular shareholder." Id. Applying
this reasoning, the court rejected the minority discount, finding that the inclusion ofsuch would
not result in a true and fair determination ofthe dissenting shareholders "proportionate interest."
Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1145.

114d. at 1145.
1 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
16

Id.

"'See Rabkin v. Olin Corp.,No. 7547 (Consolidated), [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 95,255, at 96,160, 96,164 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990), reprinted in 16 DEL.. J.
CoRP. L. 851, 861-62 (1991), affd, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1991); Citron v. E.I. DuPont de
Neumours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500-02 (Del. Ch. 1990). See also Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), and Weinbergerv. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983), for a discussion of the burden shifting analysis invoked by Dcla%%-are courts.
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In Lynch, a forty-three percent

controlling shareholder sought to acquire the remaining equity interest in

Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. (Lynch)." 9 Lynch's management
had earlier resisted an Alcatel demand that Lynch acquire an indirect
Alcatel subsidiary. 2 ° In response, Alcatel sought to buy out the
remaining fifty-seven percent that it did not hold.' Lynch's board then
appointed a committee of independent directors to evaluate the Alcatel
"'
offer. 22
The committee balked at Alcatel's offer of $14 per share,
instead seeking a price of $17 per share.'2 3 Subsequently, Alcatel raised
its bid in a series of stages to $15.50 per share, but then dug in its
heels.'2 4 When Lynch's independent directors continued to balk at the
improved price, Alcatel indicated its readiness to make a hostile tender
offer at $15.50."'5 Faced with this ultimatum and seeing no feasible
alternative, Lynch's board
backed down and approved a cash-out merger
26
share.
per
at $15.50
Interpreting these facts to mean that Alcatel had "threatened" Lynch
with a hostile offer, thereby "depriving" the Independent Committee of
an effective "power to say no,', 127 the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the burden of proving entire fairness did not shift to the plaintiff, even
though Lynch's independent committee was disinterested. 2 The precise
""638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (Lynch 1),
aff'd on remand, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995)
(Lynch I1).

"91d. at 1112-13. The controlling shareholder was the U.S. subsidiary of Alcatel, tle
French telecommunication conglomerate. Id.Lynch Communication Systems manufactures
electric telecommunication equipment, which isthen sold to telephone companies. Id.
'22"1d. at 1112-13.
' 'Id. at 1113.
'2Lynch 1, 638 A.2d at 1113.
1231d.
24
1 Id.

1251d
12Lynch 1, 638 A.2d at 1113.
'.Id. at 1120.
'Id. at 1120-21. Prior to deciding Lynch, the effects of these cases were somewhat
skewed in Delaware. In Weinberger, the court established that a controlling shareholder,
standing on both sides of atransaction, has the burden of proving that the transaction is entirely
fair. Weinberger,457 A.2d at 710. However, if an independent and disinterested committee
approves a transaction, the burden of proof can be interpreted differently. Lynch 1, 638 A.2d
at 1117. Under these circumstances, Delaware courts view the burden as shifting to the
plaintiff. Id. Thus, applying the entire fairness standard, the court focused its burden analysis
on whether the special committee (1) was truly independent and fully informed, and (2) had
the freedom to negotiate at arm's length. Id. at 1118-21. The court noted that this case-bycase analysis is extremely fact specific. Id. at 1120. The court further noted that the presence
of an independent committee can help a shareholder defend a lawsuit; however, it is not by
itself proof of a procedurally fair merger. Id. (citing Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp,,
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scope of Lynch can be reasonably debated. In its simplest reading, a
fiduciary gets nothing more than a shift in the burden of proof from
approval by a disinterested board; however, a fiduciary will not even be

entitled to this shift if it "threatens" or "dominates" the independent
committee."' Alternatively, it is possible that future decisions may
construe the case more narrowly, applying it only when there has been

"domination" of the board or
Lynch does not directly
contemplates an independent
receive the highest price that
controlling shareholder."'

committee. 130
address the issue of fair price, but it clearly
committee that will negotiate earnestly to
it can, undeterred by any "threat" from its

In doing so, it creates an apparent standoff-

the monopolistic buyer confronts the monopsonistic seller, and the
outcome of these negotiations becomes uncertain even in theory. Thus,
any visible deference given by the independent committee to the
controlling shareholder is likely to prevent a shift in the burden of
persuasion to the plaintiff.
Over the long-run, the real significance of Lynch may be that it
solves the problem of rational apathy that has long confounded the

appraisal remedy. That is, although individual shareholders may not elect
appraisal, it is predictable that a class action will be commenced on their
behalf in the case of the most significant "going private" transactions.
Thus, if the same substantive legal standards apply in these parallel
settings, they will be enforced under Lynch, even if they are more likely
to be honored in the breach in the appraisal context. As a result, the

bidder loses the incentive to underpay that today exists because some
significant percentage'of the shareholders will predictably not accept the
costs incident to the appraisal remedy.

498 A.2d 1099, 1106 & n.7 (Del. 1985)). Carefully scrutinizing the facts surrounding the
merger, the court found that the independent committee was unable to negotiate at arm's length
due to Alcatel's threats of a hostile tender offer. Id at 1121. Thus, the court held that the
independent committee's actions did not simulate that of a "third party transaction," precluding
shifting of the entire fairness burden to the plaintiff. Id
129Lynch 1,638 A.2d at 1121. "The record reflects that the ability of the Committee
effectively to negotiate at arm's length was compromised by Alcatel's threats to proceed with
a hostile tender offer if the $15.50 price was not approved by the Committee and the L)ch
board." Id.
3
'InLynch I, the Delaware Supreme Court started from the premise that a fiduciary
duty is owed only when the shareholder "ownms a majority interest in or exercises controlover
the business affairs of the corporation." Id. at 1113 (citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Neewmount
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)). It found, however, "that Alcatel did exercise
Lynch's business decisions." Id. at 1114-15.
control over
31
1 1d at 1119-22.
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The possible implications of uniting Lynch and Cavalier Oil into
a single integrated standard are best illustrated by reference to our earlier
example, in which the intrinsic value of a company is $25 per share, but
the public trading price of the minority stock is $20 per share and a fifty
percent control block has been recently purchased for $30 per share.'
Assume now that the controlling shareholder seeks to effect a squeeze-out
merger at some cash price nominally above the market price, for
example, $21 per share. Under CavalierOil, those minority shareholders
who elect their appraisal remedy would be entitled to $25 per share, and,
if Lynch requires a similar standard, the use of a merger price below $25
would entitle the minority to injunctive relief.
Although such a scenario raises economic and policy issues that
will be assessed shortly, it more immediately raises a doctrinal problem.
Recent Delaware decisions suggest that the above described hypothetical
transaction will be deemed fair, even if a third party has offered a higher
price. 3 As next discussed, these cases can arguably be read to imply
that those who pay a control premium acquire a property right that limits
both the rights and powers of minority shareholders and independent
directors.
E. The Rights of a ControlPerson: The Delaware Case Law
The Delaware law on control is not a seamless web. Potentially
discordant strands exist that could lead Delaware law to evolve in a
contrary direction from that suggested by Lynch. One of the most
problematic decisions in any attempt to assess the overall Delaware law
3 4 In Mendel, the Carroll family, who
on control is Mendel v. Carroll.'
controlled between forty-eight percent and fifty-two percent of the stock
of Katy Industries, Inc. (Katy), sought to eliminate the "minority"
interest."' A committee of independent directors was appointed and
initially resisted because the Carroll family's first offer of $22 per share
was $2 below the corporation's stock market price on the date the offer

"323See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text for reference to this example.
' See, e.g., Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994); Freedman v. Restaurant
Assocs. Indus., Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,502 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 16, 1987), reprintedin 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651 (1988).
'651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994).
"'5 1d. at 298-300. The Carroll family founded Katy Industries. Id. In 1992, they
agreed to purchase all publicly-held shares of Katy as well as all non-Carroll shares of the
company. Id. The squeeze-out in this case is extremely similar to that of the Lynch case
discussed previously.
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was made.' 36 The Carroll family later raised its offer to the market price
of $24, but the independent directors continued to insist on $26."'
Eventually, a merger agreement was reached at $25.75; however, on the
announcement of the deal, a third party surfaced, offering $28 for all of
Katy's outstanding shares.'3 8 After further developments, the third party
decreased its offer to $27.80,' conditioning the offer on Katy's board
granting the third party bidder a stock lockup equal to 1.8 million shares
at the merger price in order to dilute the Carroll family's control. 4
When Katy's outside counsel reported that there was legal uncertainty
about the validity of such a proposed lockup, Katy's board backed away
from the third party offer. 4 '
In due course, the now hostile third party brought suit, alleging that
the board could not facilitate a merger with its controlling shareholder at
a price below that offered by a third party bidder. 4 , "Revlon duties," it
said, applied.'43 The simplest answer to this claim might have been that
Revlon duties arise only when there is a sale of control. Because the
Carroll family had always held control of Katy, Revlon did not seem
applicable.'" Chancellor Allen chose, however, to address the issues
more broadly, by asking whether the controlling shareholder had a duty

to self-sacrifice, subordinating its interests to those of the minority by

"6 d. at 300. The stock price rose to $24 per share during the months between the
offer and proposal. Id. Under the reasoning of Lynch, it is arguable that the Carroll offer
might even
qualify as a "threat."
137id.
"38Mendel, 651 A.2d at 299-301. The third party, Rosecliff Pensler Partners, L.P.,

contacted Katy's chairman regarding the offer in September 1993. Id. at 300-01. Following
this offer, a special committee advised the board that it could no longer endorse the Carroll
merger. I, At this time, it was again noted that the Carrolls would not sell their shares, thus,
precluding a merger with Pensler. Id.
'"Id at 302.
'
at 306. The result of this stock lockup would be to dilute the Carroll family's
control. Id. The uncertain legality of this transaction was consistently noted by the special
committee throughout the negotiations. Id.
41Id. at 302-03.

"'Mendel, 651 A.2d at 302-03.
4See id at 303-04. See also Revlon Inc. v. MacAndre%%s & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
508 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that directors have a duty to maximize the value of its
corporation's stock by obtaining the best price at its sale). The plaintiffs argued that the
"Revlon duties" were invoked by the board's decision to accept the Carroll merger. Mendel,

651 A.2d at 303. These duties oblige the board to "maximize the current value of [the]
shares." Id In this case, maximization could.only occur by accepting Pensler's offer,
regardless44 of the fact that it dilutes Carroll's ownership. Id.
Mendel, 651 A.2d at 304-07.
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selling its shares in the merger at a price it considered unattractive. 4 ' He
framed the issue with his customary succinctness:
Plaintiffs see in the Carroll Group's unwillingness to sell at
$27.80 or to buy at that price, a denial of plaintiff's ability
to realize such a price, and see this as an exploitation or
breach of duty. This view implicitly regards the $27.80 per
share price and the Carroll Family Merger price of $25.75
as comparable sorts of things. But they are legally and
financially quite different. It is, for example, quitepossible
that the Carroll $25.75 price may have been fair, even
generous, while
the $27.80 Pensler price may be
46
inadequate.
Chancellor Allen's point cannot be denied that controlling shares have a
higher value than the minority or "public" shares traded in the market. 47
Logically, the third party bidder would have had to pay a control
premium to acquire control, while the control group could expect to pay
less to acquire the remaining noncontrolling shares.'48
True as this fact may be, it only states, rather than resolves, the
normative issue: can the minority shareholders be forced to accept the
lower of two rival bids on the ground that a controlling shareholder need
not match the price offered by a rival bidder? When can the board take
action to protect the minority? The first question is easier to answer than
the second. Although Delaware would clearly entitle controlling
shareholders to refuse to vote for a merger that deprived them of their
control premium, 49 it is less clear when or why the board of directors is

"I5 d. The plaintiffs assumed that the minority shareholders were being "exploited" by
the controlling shareholder because the Pensler offer would have increased the latter's stock
value. Id. When such exploitation is present, the board may act to protect the minority, even
when such
protection dilutes the controlling shareholder. Id.
'461d. at 304.
7
"W
1d. at 305. The court noted that the Carrolls already had control because they owned
between 48 and 52% of the stock. Id. Thus, the per share prices of the Pensler and Carroll
offers were different in that the former involved sale of complete control while the latter solely
involved 4the purchase of noncontrolling stock. Id.
1 'Mendel, 651 A.2d at 305.
49
' In Thorpe v CERBCO, Inc., No. 345, 1995, 1996 Del. LEXIS 144 (Del. Apr. 10,
1996), defendants, who were both directors and controlling shareholders of a Delaware
corporation, were found to have breached their duty of loyalty by usurping a corporate
opportunity. Id. However, because the opportunity would have required a shareholder vote
for its acceptance, Chancellor Allen had found that the defendants were entitled to block
acceptance in their capacity as shareholders. Id. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court
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required to respect their preference. In addition, if the acquisition of de
facto control entitles the controlling shareholder to force through the
lower-priced merger., this power co-exists uneasily with the principle that
shareholders are entitled to their proportionate interest in the firm. Unless
qualified, Mendel's logic might suggest that minority discounts can reenter the scene by a far more important door than Cavalier Oil closed.
Clearly, much then depends on how we read Mendel. The narrow
legal issue in Mendel was only whether the Katy board was justified in
refusing to issue a dilutive option to the hostile bidder that would enable
it to obtain control, despite the implacable opposition of the Carroll
group. 50 This request for extraordinary relief could have been denied on
any of a variety of narrow or technical grounds.'
Instead, Chancellor
Allen wrote broadly that "the Katy board could not, consistent with its
fiduciary obligations to all of the stockholders of Katy Industries, have
issued the dilutive option for the purpose sought in this instance."' 52 In
short, not only did the board not have any obligation to issue the
proposed option, it also lacked the right to do so.
When then would a board be entitled to issue such a dilutive option
to an outsider? In both an earlier decision5 . and in Mendel, Chancellor
Allen has recognized that such an issuance to an outside control seeker
could sometimes be justified.'5 4 In Mendel, he suggests that the board
must be seeking "to protect the minority from plain overreaching" or a
"threatened serious breach of fiduciary duty by the controlling
stock[holder]" to support such an extraordinary action.' 55 Although it is

accepted the logic of Chancellor Allen's position that shareholders are entitled to act in their
own self-interest, but still held that the defendants were liable to disgorge profits and to pay
certain compensatory damages attributable to their fiduciary breach. See supra notes 86-98 and
accompanying text. This result may suggest a narrower definition of the shareholder's right
to pursue its own self-interest than contemplated in Mendel.
"Mendel, 651 A.2d at 304.
"'For example, the board might simply have relied upon the advice of counsel that
there were legal uncertainties concerning their power to grant the option that made it advisable
to, under the circumstances, prefer the lower-priced but more secure offer from the Carroll
group.

"'Id at 307. Although a board may issue a dilutive stock option to protect an
exploited minority, the board has no duty "to deploy corporate power against the majority
stockholders, in the absence of a threatened serious breach of fiduciary duty by the controlling
stock[holder]." Id. at 306.
"'See Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,502 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987), reprintedin 13 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 651
(1988) (finding that a board was not compelled to dilute a controlling shareholder, but could
do so in pursuit of a proper corporate purpose).
Mendel, 651 A.2d at 306.
155Id.
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understandable that the court chose to be somewhat vague on this score,
these terms give little indication of where the tipping point lies between
"plain overreaching" and justifiable insistence on one's rights as a
controlling shareholder. Reading Lynch, one could easily gain a sense
that a controlling shareholder who asks the board's independent
committee to accept the lower of two offers might be engaged in just
such "plain overreaching". Still, the Delaware Supreme Court's ultimate
resolution of that litigation found that the controlling shareholder's
terms
56
were fair to the minority, notwithstanding its "threat.'0
Perhaps the best way to locate this tipping point is to focus on the
amount that the Mendel court would award to the minority shareholders
as fair value, if they had dissented from the cash-out merger and
exercised their right of appraisal. Our earlier analysis concluded that
minority shareholders in such circumstances should be entitled to
proportionate value in the corporation, valued as a going concern. 57
Logically, the minority's entitlement seems no different when the focus
shifts from appraisal to the premerger context that Mendel and Lynch
address.' 58 Thus, if the minority is entitled to their proportionate interest
in the appraisal proceedings, consistency suggests that they should be
afforded the same entitlement in an injunctive proceeding based on
Lynch. Indeed, in economic terms, the basic difference between these
two contexts is simply that between a liability rule and a property rule.' 59
This proposed compromise, that the minority should be entitled to
proportionate value, rather than equal opportunity, reconciles Mendel and
Lynch in a manner that both permits the controlling shareholder to receive
a premium and protects the minority from the imposition of a de facto
minority discount. To illustrate its operation, assume, as before, that a
fifty percent control block exists in a publicly held corporation in which
the "minority shares" trade at $20 per share. Assume further that
"proportionate value" in this case would be $25 per share. 6 On these
S6See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc. 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) (holding that

cash-out merger satisfied the entire fairness standard).
'See supranotes 24-84 and accompanying text. This presumption did not include any
synergy gains that a combination of the two firms may produce.
"'See supra notes 118-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lynch and
Mendel cases.
"'See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972)
(discussing various legal rules and suggesting their integration); David Cohen, Comment,
Valuation in the Context of Share Appraisal, 34 EMORY L.J. 117 (1985) (classifying
shareholder remedies in terms of liability rules versus injunctive rules).
''he $25 valuation is based on all possible valuation standards but excludes any
synergy gains that a combination of the corporation with another entity might produce.
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facts, if an outside bidder offered $28 per share for the minority shares
on the condition that a dilutive stock option would shift control to it, the
existing controlling shareholder could ask the board to prefer its lower
$25 per share offer. Conversely, if the controlling shareholder responded
with a $23 offer, a price below the $25 proportionate value, this would
constitute "plain overreaching" and wouldjustify the board in granting the
option.
But if it is understandable that the controlling shareholder could
prefer its own self-interest, why must the board defer to it? Chancellor
Allen's view may have simply been that a dilutive stock option is a
questionable tactic when employed against a party that has legitimately
gained control.' If we assume that the Carroll family held fifty percent
or more of the stock, it is clear that issuance of the option would have
diluted their majority position. But what if they held only de facto
control with a very solid thirty-five percent voting block and no other
large holder? Here, it seems harder to justify why a dilutive option
should have been impermissible, although certainly not mandatory, if the
board had desired to foment a bidding contest between the Pensler group
and the Carroll family. Indeed, there are strong arguments that this is
precisely what the board should do to protect the 65% "minority" on
these revised facts.
In essence, Chancellor Allen's approach in Mendel seems to treat
the acquisition of control as creating a right and not simply a privilege.
However, it is only a limited right: namely, the right of the controlling
stockholder to monopolize the discounted value of expected synergy
gains. Yet, the control holder may still be required to respect the
minority's right to their proportionate value in the existing company's
intrinsic value.
From a policy perspective, this position would encourage efficient
transactions, while chilling inefficient ones. In effect, the selling
shareholder could pocket that portion of the control premium which
reflects special synergies or efficiencies from the acquisition, but it cannot
reduce the minority's share below a proportionate interest in the preexisting value of the firm. Thus, it remains normatively troubling. 6
'6 'Decisions such as Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), and
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), can be read to deny the
board the power to preempt a voting contest, but no shareholder vote was impending in
Mendel. Corporate action that seeks to dilute control has also been disfavored in Delaware.
See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., Inc., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985). Howevcr, Frant=
involved an attempt to undo a takeover that had seemingly already passed control to a new
control group. Id.
"It is, of course, uncertain that the Mendel court would have found the board disabled
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Even this parsimonious definition of the minority's rights will
dissatisfy those economists who would prefer a legal rule that gives
public shareholders nothing more than a nominal value over the prior
public trading price of the minority shares. 63 Any greater entitlement,64
they argue, will deter some efficiency-promoting transactions.
However, the foregoing proportionate standard would deter some
inefficient transactions, specifically those where the acquirer intends not
to realize new synergies, but only to realize private benefits of control
greater than those enjoyed by the incumbent control holder. 65 The
possible incentive effects of these alternative formulas will be analyzed
in more detail in Part II.
F. An Initial Policy Assessment
Although commentators have primarily focused on the effects of
the state law doctrine that generally permits control premiums, this
section has argued that the incentive effects of this rule are likely to be
overshadowed by other legal doctrines, such as appraisal rights, the
availability of injunctive or damage actions based on Weinberger and
Lynch, and SEC rules under the Williams Act. Collectively, these
doctrines tend to discourage the payment of a control premium, at least
when the intent is to eliminate the minority, because they may entitle the
minority to a similar price that is at least reasonably related to what the
control seller received.
Still, even if these rules chill control premiums, they do not
necessarily discourage inefficient control transactions. One obvious gap
exists: they do not discourage a partial acquisition of a controlling block
that is not followed by a take-out merger or other transaction that
eliminates the minority. Arguably, these transactions represent potentially

from issuing a stock lockup to attract a higher bidder in a case where the control group held
less than a majority of the voting stock. To do so seems unjustified, because it effectively
presumes that the other shareholders surrendered their claim to have the board act in their best
interest by encouraging an auction. In the case of a majority control group, it at least can be
said that an auction disfavors the interests of a majority of the shareholders.
63
' See Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 351 (proposing that minority shareholder
should be awarded only the preinvestment price of their interest as an appraisal price).
'"Id.
at 362.
'65An acquirer considers two types of benefits prior to purchasing a control block.
Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of Public
Corporations,25 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 373-74 (1989). First, the acquirer will consider the
amount of dividends and other cash flows to be received by all shareholders based on their
interest in the company. Id. Second, the acquirer will evaluate the private benefits it will
receive as a result of the transaction. Id.
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the most inefficient category of control transactions because the new
buyer has a greater incentive to exploit the private benefits of control
when it does not anticipate acquiring the remaining minority interest.
Yet, because such a private transaction neither triggers appraisal nor
involves corporate action, none of the principles enunciated in Lynch,
Weinberger, or Cavalier Oil are typically implicated by such a partial
acquisition. Only those antique cases dealing with looting or the sale of
corporate office seem to apply in this context.'6 6 With minimal planning
and some cosmetics, the skillful practitioner can probably sidestep this
obstacle.
Indeed, it could be argued that by discouraging back-end "going
private" mergers, the SEC's rules, particularly Rule 13e-3, encourage
partial acquisitions in which the acquirer is more likely to exploit the
private benefits of control because the SEC has made it more costly to
pursue the synergy gains that require full integration of the two firms. 67
This argument can easily be overstated, however, because it is
increasingly becoming dated. A fifteen to twenty percent purchaser, who
acquired a dominant board position from the seller incident to its
purchase of the seller's controlling stock, could once expect to maintain
control of the corporation. This prospect has increasingly become
attenuated. The rise of the institutional investor has resulted in a new
concentration of share ownership,'68 reducing the costs of collective action
and making the likelihood of control exploitation by a small holder
increasingly remote.
Of course, a larger block, for example, over thirty percent, still
carries defacto control; yet, as the acquirer is forced to assemble a larger
block to gain control, the private benefits of control dissipate
correspondingly. 69 Put simply, while a ten percent shareholder who
misappropriates corporate funds steals ninety percent of its resulting gains
from the other shareholders, a thirty percent shareholder effectively
misappropriates only seventy percent from the others and thirty percent
from itself. Similarly, the larger and more costly the controlling block

'6See supranotes 70-72 and accompanying text for a briefdiscussion ofsales ofoffice
and its relevant case law.
' 67Hazen, supra note 1, at 278-81 (discussing federal securities laws governing sales
of control).
"*'Foran overview of the institutional investor's impact on corporate governance and
the new concentration in share ownership, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the
InstitutionalInvestor. A Half-Tune Report, 15 CARwozo L. REV. 837 (1994).
' 69Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 986. See also Barclay & Holderness, supranote 165, at

384 (noting that few private benefits result from a large block once such holder dominates the
board).
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that must be assembled to enjoy the private benefits of control, the
smaller the likely gains from exploitation of such private benefits (i.e.,
excessive compensation or unfair self-dealing) will look in relation to this
initial acquisition cost. In short, the market's evolution may have created
its own partial remedy against attempts to acquire the minimum
controlling block necessary to exploit the private benefits of control.
A more serious criticism that can be levelled at the SEC's implicit
equal opportunity norm is that it may discourage some efficiencyenhancing transactions. 70 To illustrate, let us return to a variant of the
example used earlier: assume that a fifty percent block in a firm with an
intrinsic value of $20 per share is acquired at the premium price of $30
per share. If the acquirer of this block now proposes a squeeze-out
merger, those minority shareholders who dissent should be able to obtain
$20 per share in an appraisal proceeding under those Delaware appraisal
cases that reject minority discounts.'' If all minority shareholders were
to exercise their appraisal remedy, it would cost the acquirer an average
price of $25 per share to acquire all the equity in this firm. This implies,
in turn, that the acquirer will only pay the $30 per share control premium
if it anticipates that under its management it can increase the value of the
acquired business from $20 per share to more than $25. 12
On these facts, a proportionate value rule may screen out some
inefficient transactions,1 3 but it blocks some efficient ones as well. The
downside of this rule comes into clearer focus if we assume that the
acquirer views the target in its hands as worth more than its stock market
value of $20 per share, but less than $25 per share. For example, if the
value of the target to the acquirer were $23 per share due to synergistic
gains that depend on its improved management, the acquirer would be
unable to effect this efficiency-promoting transaction if the incumbent
management held out for a price for its 50% block in excess of $26 per
share. The incumbent management might logically hold out because it

70

Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 960 (comparing the equal opportunity rule with the market
rule in the context of efficiency); Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1490 (summarizing the various
theories as to why equal opportunity discourages efficient transactions). It has been asserted
that an equal opportunity rule deters efficient transfers because it forces the majority to forego
any advantages
a control sale should bring. Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 972.
7
1'
See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
72
1 Virtually all commentators concur in this analysis. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note
1, at 1124 (noting that acquirers only pay premiums if they believe the corporation's value will
increase 1or
they intend to "appropriate" some of the minority's assets).
7
'Basically, it discourages those acquirers who might plan to suspend dividends, pay
excessive salaries or otherwise engage in unfair self-dealing precisely in order to make the
back-end price fall from $20 to a lower price.
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valued the private benefits of control at $26 per share or higher. As a
result, if the acquirer must pay $20 to the fifty percent "minority"
shareholders and anything above $26 per share to the controlling
shareholder, for a weighted average price of $23 per share, the efficiencyenhancing transaction is blocked.
The real point here is that the foregoing argument proves too much
because it can even be used to justify transactions that pay the minority
less than the market value for their shares. One, therefore, cannot frame
public policy looking only to whether a proposed rule maximizes the
incentives to bidders. The critical question instead becomes the relative

balance between the efficient versus inefficient transactions that are
discouraged by a proposed rule. Here, economists have largely agreed
that an equal opportunity rule will, on balance, discourage more efficient
transactions than inefficient ones.' 74 However, these criticisms apply with
considerably less force to a rule entitling the minority shareholder to
proportionate value, rather than equal sharing. As a result, the relative
balance of efficient versus inefficient transactions discouraged will be

different. However, some efficient transactions will clearly be chilled."
Two policy justifications can be advanced for a proportionate
interest rule that cannot be as easily used to support an equal opportunity
rule. First, the focus of such a rule is more directly aimed at deterring

inefficient transactions in which the purchaser of control hopes to drive
down the market price by some oppressive tactic in order to achieve a

cheaper back-end merger that eliminates the minority. An equal
opportunity rule overcorrects this problem by entitling the minority to a
price that may be above the finn's intrinsic value; however, a
proportionate interest rule focuses more modestly and appropriately on
simply barring potentially inefficient transactions. "6
Second, a

proportionate interest rule should chill efficient transactions only when
either (1) the private benefits of control to the control seller are very

high, or (2) the synergistic gains anticipated by the control seeker are
"74See Bebehuk, supra note 3; Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 3; Kahan, svpra note
3.

" 5Assume for example, that the intrinsic value is S20 per share, the current market
price is $18, and that the control seller will not sell its 25% block for less than S23 par share.
The control acquirer can still pay this S23 price and also offer a small premium (S19) to the
other 75% of the shareholders, thereby paying an average price of $20. However, if the
acquirer were required to pay $20 to all other shareholders, as a proportionate value rule would
require, this transaction could become unattractive because now the average price would
become $20.75. If it did not anticipate synergistic gains greater than 75g a share, the acquirer
could not rationally consummate this transaction.
'76Ethauge, supra note 4, at 1486 (noting that a right to a proportionate share provides
a "prophylactic incentive structure that self-deters non-productive sales of control").
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relatively modest.'77 The first condition will rarely apply because
empirical evidence shows that the private benefits of control represent a
relatively modest percentage of firm value in the United States. 78 The
second condition can arise more frequently, but it implies that the
efficiency loss in such a case will also be correspondingly modest.
More importantly, considerable evidence also suggests that bidders
tend to overestimate the synergistic gains from acquisitions.7 9 Indeed,
acquirers may overpay so systematically that in the view of some
commentators the stock market has come to expect overpayment. 8 If
such a tendency toward overpayment exists, the fact that a proportionate
interest rule would constitute a mild disincentive may not be harmful.
Uniquely, it would discourage transactions in which even the acquirer
saw only modest gains from the acquisition.
By definition, a proportionate interest rule will not block
transactions in which the bidder expects synergy gains substantially in
excess of the control premium demanded by the control seller. If the
private benefits of control average less than five percent of the value of
the corporation's equity,'' control sellers, although they will seek a

higher premium, should be willing to settle for a premium in this
Hence, a proportionate interest rule would not block
range.Y12
transactions in which the expected synergies greatly exceed this level. 3

'7A proportionate value rule will chill an acquisition if the control seller demands a
large premium and the control buyer anticipates little synergistic gain from the acquisition. As
in supra note 175, assume that intrinsic value is $20 per share, and the buyer believes that the
enhanced value of the firm under its management will rise only to $22 (or 10%). It cannot
now pay a premium price of $25 per share to a 50% control seller, because this would raise
the weighted average price to $22.50 under a proportionate interest rule.
"'One study estimates the private benefits of control at 3 to 4% of the equity value of
the corporation. See Barclay & Holderness, supra note 165. On this basis, if we assume that
a corporation's intrinsic value and market price are both $20, then the private benefits of
control would justify a premium of less than $1.
"'See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. Rv. 597
(1989) (discussing conflict between the ex post evidence of minimal gains from acquisitions
versus the stock price evidence suggesting substantial expected gains). See also sources cited
supra note 9 (discussing the inefficient results of mergers).
"'Black, supra note 179, at 597-99.
"'For this estimate, see Barclay & Holdemess, supra note 165, at 371.
"'in fact, one study found the average control premium in the case of publicly held
companies to be 5.44%. See Ronald C. Lease et al., The Market Value of Control in PubliclyTraded Corporations, I1 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1983).
"..A proportionate interest rule does not force the sharing of synergy gains, but only
requires that an above-market price be paid when market value is below intrinsic value. Such
a circumstance may result when either the seller has been exploiting the private benefits of
control or the buyer is expected to.
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Only transactions in which the expected efficiency gains were very
modest, if they existed at all, can run afoul of such a rule.
PART 11. THEORY AND EVIDENCE: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY
OF INEFFICIENT CONTROL TRANSFERS
A. The Limited EmpiricalData on ControlPremium Transactions
There has been surprisingly little empirical work on the impact of
a sale of a control block on minority shareholders; yet, the work that has
been done clearly shows that such a sale can have either a positive or
negative impact on the value of the outstanding minority shares. In the
best known study," 4 Professors Holderness and Sheehan examined a
sample of the 114 New York or American Stock Exchange listed
companies in which an individual or entity owned between 50.1% and
95% of the outstanding common stock. 5 From this sample, they were
able to identify thirty-one companies that announced a sale of a majority
block between 1978 and 1982.86 Measuring the cumulative abnormal
returns to the common stock of these companies, they found that on
average the minority shares in this sample earned statistically significant
abnormal returns of (1) 7.3% over the period from the day before the
announcement day through the end of the announcement day, and (2)
12.8% over the thirty-day period beginning twenty days before the
announcement and extending until ten days after the announcement.'"
At first glance, such data seems to clearly imply that the
But at least two
acquisition of a control block benefits the minority.'
major qualifications must be noted that interfere with any such simple
policy conclusion. First, the meaning of this data is clouded by the
market's expectation that the control sale would be followed by a tender
offer at a similar premium for the minority shares. In fact, in at least ten
of these thirty-one cases, the announcement of the majority block sale
was accompanied by the announcement of a simultaneous tender offer for
the minority stock. 9 Such an event would obviously dominate the

"See Clifford B. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role ofMajorityShareholders
in Publicly Held Corporations,20 J. FIN. EcoN. 317 (1988).
"SSeeiL at 320. Holdemess and Sheehan identified 650 publicly traded companies
having a majority shareholder but studied only the 114 traded on the NYSE or the AMEX.
'8Id at 327-30.
'8711

at 328.

"g'SeeElhauge, supra note 4, at 1500 (discussing the Holdemess and Sheehan study
and suggesting that minority shares increase in value when a control block is sold).
""See Holderess & Sheehan, supra note 184, at 328.
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market's reaction to the majority block sale. Ignoring these ten cases, the
reduced subsample of twenty-one cases still earned statistically significant
returns of 5.5% on the announcement day and 9.4% over the thirty day
period. 9 Nonetheless, it is unclear that the exclusion of those cases, in
which there was a simultaneous announcement of a tender offer,
adequately corrects for the strong possibility that the market's reaction to
the majority transfer may have been influenced by its expectation that a
tender offer at a premium for the minority shares was likely. Such an
expectation would obviously bias upward the market's reaction to the
majority block transfer.
More importantly, the Holderness and Sheehan study also reveals
that the market's reaction to a transfer of control can be negative with the
price of the public shares declining. Although 65% of the thirty-day
period observations for the thirty-one company sample were positive, a
nontrivial 35% of the cases, in which the returns were not positive,' 9' still
results. This finding seems especially counter-intuitive in view of the
likelihood of an above-market tender offer being eventually associated
with the controlling block sale.
The second problem with the Holderness and Sheehan study is that
it focused only on the stock price reaction to a majority block transfer. 9 2
Thus, it could not examine the market's response to the sale of a
controlling block that fell below a majority or its reaction to the slower
assembly of a control block through multiple smaller purchases from
noncontrolling shareholders. Logic suggests that the market's reaction to
such transactions would more frequently be negative. Because the
purchaser of a majority block is acquiring more shares than it needs to
obtain effective control, such majority block transactions are less likely
to be motivated by a desire to obtain "private" benefits, not available to
others, from the control relationship. The higher the percentage of the
stock that the control seeker buys, the greater the likelihood that it
expects the value of the company to increase, and the less the likelihood
that the control seeker is motivated by a desire to obtain private
benefits.' 93 The logic of this proposition rests on the obvious truth that
one has no incentive to steal from oneself. If one is buying control to
"loot" the company, then one wants to buy as little stock as possible
at 330.
'"Id.at 328. Nineteen percent of the one-day announcement day returns were negative
in this same 31 company sample. Id. One suspects that the percentages would be higher for
the 21 company sample that results from subtracting out the 10 cases involving simultaneous
tender offers.
"2 This study only analyzed the transfer of blocks in excess of 50.1%. Id. at 327.
"'Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1509-11.
'90.
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because the stock value after such wealth expropriations should decline."'
A 100% owner, of course, has no incentive to "loot" because it would be
the victim of its own crime. 95 The anecdotal evidence about Victor
Posner and other controversial raiders is consistent with this hypothesis:
they tend to remain the minority, although controlling, and seldom buy
all the stock, unless they have depressed its value and can purchase at a
large discount.
More than anecdotal evidence supports this hypothesis that the
assembly of a control block by a shareholder who does not seek complete
ownership will elicit a negative stock market reaction. In an extensive
empirical study, Professor Karen Wruck found that firm value generally
Breaking her data
increased with greater ownership concentration."'
down, she found that increases in ownership concentration enhanced firm
value "when the level of ownership concentration is high or low."''
However, in the middle range, there was a negative correlation. '
Additionally, when private sales of equity were used to transfer control
to the purchaser, or even simply to "put the purchaser on the board of
directors," the stock price impact was again negative.""
The simplest explanation for these findings is that significant
shareholders reduce agency cost problems and enable shareholders to hold
managers accountable, thus causing firm value to rise.2" Firm value
tends to increase with ownership concentration until the point that the
large shareholder is able to credibly threaten to seize control itself."9 '
Once control has been acquired, further increases in ownership
concentration are deemed desirable by the market because they are

1941d.
191d. at 1485. "Looters are not looking for special synergies; they can search for the

cheapest opportunity to buy control over a lootable corporation." Id. at 1510.
'See Wruck, supra note 33, at 3.

'971a at 23.

"°'SeeWruck, supranote 33, at 14-16. As the following passage indicates, however,
this conclusion is dependent on the interests of such shareholders being aligned with
management:
The effect of a change in ownership concentration on firm value
depends on the market's assessment of its effect on resource allocation within
the firm, and the probability of a takeover. For a particular firm, value
increases if the change in owvership more closely aligns manager and
shareholder interests. Firm value falls if the private sale allows entrenchment,
creating a concentrated owvnership structure that fosters the misallocation of
resources and effectively blocks attempted takeovers.
Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted).
20
Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1487-88.
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perceived to reflect a desire by the controlling shareholder to buy out the
remaining minority shareholders, rather than leaving them locked into an
illiquid investment.
A second study further corroborates the tendency for firm value to
fall as ownership concentration nears the point where a shareholder group
threatens to acquire control. Focusing on the aggregate percentage held
by insiders, Professors Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny. 2 found that firm
value seemed to increase when the total ownership held by the board rose
to five percent, but thereafter fell as the level rose to twenty-five percent,
and then rose again in the relatively few cases where board ownership
rose above this level.2"3 They interpreted their data to support the thesis
that agency costs were reduced as board ownership rose to five percent,
but thereafter the risk of managerial entrenchment overcame the agency
cost reduction effect.20 4 At the twenty-five percent level, however,
managerial control seemed assured, and further ownership increases after
this point did not heighten the risk of managerial entrenchment, but rather
increased the prospect of a profitable buyout.20'
This evidence does not support a simple generalization that control
transfers are good or bad for minority shareholders. In general, majority
block purchases do seem to benefit minority shareholders, but there are
also instances of negative market reactions as well.2" 6 More importantly,
the gradual seizure of control appears to reduce the value of the minority
shares, at least until it becomes clear that the control seeker is likely to
pursue the remaining minority interest. Transfers of nonmajority
controlling blocks have been less studied, but may be even more likely
to elicit a negative market reaction. 0 7
No simple public policy conclusion emerges from this evidence
that can be uniformly applied. But once the possibility of control
transfers that reduce the value of the minority shares is recognized, the

202

See Randall Morck et at., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988).
23
1d. at 311.
2
d.at 311-14.
205

1d.

2

'"Wruck,supra note 33, at 3 (discussing market increases and decreases associated

with private
and public sales, respectively).
20

'Wruck finds that on average the announcement of a private sale of equity by the
company is associated with a 4.5% increase in the shareholder wealth of the nonparticipating
shareholders. See Wruck, supra note 33, at 3. However, such private sales by the company
show the approval of the corporation's board of directors and thus do not bear on the issue of
the market's reaction to secondary sales.
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relevance of the protections afforded by a proportionate value rule at least
becomes clearer.
B. The Simple Economics of Sales of CorporateControl
When there is a change of control, the value that thereafter flows
to the shareholder group can change in one of two general ways.' 3 First,
future cash flows (FCF) can increase or decrease as a result of (1) better
or worse management, or (2) enhanced or decreased synergies, either
operating or financial." 9 Second, some corporate value can be diverted
to the new controlling shareholder as a private benefit of control - either
more or less than was diverted by the prior controlling shareholder!" 0
The net effect of a control change on the shareholders depends on
whether the aggregate change in these two components is positive or
negative; that is, does the increase (if any) in FCF exceed the increase (if
any) in the private benefits of control (PBC) that the new controller
diverts to itself? Potentially, a new controller could increase its
consumption of the private benefits of control while still improving
management so that the minority shareholders would benefit. For the
public or minority shareholder, the value of the corporation (CV) can be
expressed in a simple formula as the amount of future cash flows (FCF)
minus the consumption of private benefits: CV = FCF - PBC.
One implication of this perspective is that there is no inherent
control premium. The amount that a control seeker will pay to the
outgoing control holder depends on how much more profitably the buyer
believes it can manage the firm's assets and how much it believes it will
consume in terms of the private benefits of control. 2 11 Thus, our earlier
example in which the company's public shares traded at $20 while the
controlling shares were assumed to be worth $30 needs to be updated.
The more a prospective bidder believes that it can improve the firm's
future cash flows (FCF), the greater the premium it will be willing to pay
for control. If it does not believe it can improve FCF, the most logical

...
The analysis in this section borrows from Lucian Bebchuk. See Bebchuksupra note
3, at 957.
2O9Md

2

"Elhauge, supra note 4, at 1497-98. In addition to simple theft or misappropriation,
the term "private benefits of control" includes subtler elements, such as unfair self-dealing,
excessive compensation, or usurpation of corporate opportunities. See generally Barclay &
Holdemess, supra note 165, for a discussion of private benefits in control transfers. Barclay
and Holderness argue that control premiums can be used to estimate the amount of private
benefits the acquirer will receive as a result of ownership. Id. at 375.
"'Barclay & Holderness, supra note 165, at 375-95.
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reason that it will pay a premium is to increase its consumption of private
benefits (PBC)." 2 When the value of the public shares rises in the wake
of a control block acquisition, this reflects the market's judgment that (a)
FCF will increase under the new controller, (b) the consumption of PBC
will decrease, or (c) the combination of the changes in the two variables
will be positive. Conversely, when the value of the public shares declines
in the wake of the control block sale, the reverse is true, but the market
most likely expects the consumption of PBC to increase.
Some have estimated that, in the case of public corporations in the
United States, the private benefits of control amount on average to
between three to four percent of equity value of the corporation.2 t3
Although this estimate may be no more than a crude approximation, it
contrasts surprisingly with the evidence on the size of control premiums.
Although some studies of closely held corporations find the premium in
this context to be very large,214 a study of publicly held firms found the
more modest average control premium to be only 5.44%.25 On this
basis, in the case of public corporations, the private benefits of control
could account for the majority of the average control premium.2 6
Conversely, assuming the accuracy of this data, it would be more difficult
for the private benefits of control to explain control premiums in the case
of private companies, where they seem to average between fifty and
seventy percent.2 17

2 12

Brudney, supra note 1, at 1124. See also Barclay & Holderness, supra note 165,
at 375-76 (stating that private benefits of control are "the most likely explanation for the
substantial premiums paid for large-percentage blocks"). Other reasons may also support the
payment of control premiums. Id. at 375, 381-82. Barclay and Holdemess hypothesize that
control purchasers either have "superior knowledge" regarding a company's value or that such
purchasers merely overpay for control. Id. at 381-82.
2 3

2

Barclay & Holderness, supra note 165, at 395.

See Larry G. Meeker & 0. Maurice Joy, Price Premiumsfor ControllingShares of
Closely Held Bank Stock, 53 J. Bus. 297 (1980). These studies found the premiums to be
between 252 and 72%, depending on the class of the company. Id. at 298.
'"See Lease et al., supra note 182, at 469.
2 6
This is so because the average 5.44% premium only marginally exceeds the typical
value of the private benefits of control. See supra text accompanying note 213.
2

'See Meeker & Joy, supra note 214 (finding premiums to range between 52 and

72%). Barclay and Holdemess estimate that the private benefits of control equalled 3-4% of
equity value applied only to public corporations. See supra text accompanying note 216.
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C. The Casefor ProportionateValue
A number of commentators have focused on the criteria that should
define the optimal appraisal remedy."' They have largely agreed that an

overly generous remedy will deter efficient transactions, while a remedy
that undercompensates dissenting minority shareholders will produce both

an inefficient allocation of corporate assets and increase the cost of
capital to corporations over the long run.21 9 From an ex ante perspective,

the more the minority fears transactions structured by the majority, which
expropriate their proportionate share in the corporation, the less they will
be willing to pay for equity in corporations that are subject to such risks.

Thus, at least to the extent that the controlling shareholder expects to
raise capital by selling equity, it too will share an interest in an adequate
appraisal remedy that deters uncompensated wealth transfers'- 0
This perspective leads quickly to the realization that stock market

value alone cannot be the standard for determining fair value in
circumstances where a controlling shareholder is cashing out the

minority."
The stock price, particularly in an efficient market,
inherently factors in the likelihood that the majority will overreach the
minority.'m Moreover, it will factor into the stock price not only the past
loss caused by the selling controller, but also any expectation of future
expropriations by a new controlling shareholdernz As a result, as one

commentator has phrased it, "[T]he greater the misconduct by the
majority, the less they need to pay for the minority's shares."

4

Minority

discounts only compound this problem by adding a further discount to the
stock price.

These court-imposed discounts are arguably redundant

M'See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 1, at 505 (promulgating the equal opportunity rule);
Daniel P. Fisehel, The AppraisalRemedy in CorporateLaw, 1983 AM. B. FOlUD. RES. J. 875
(discussing the appraisal remedy but proposing that it increases the value of all shares); Heglar,
supra note 23, at 258 (evaluating minority discounts and concluding that they are both
practically and theoretically inefficient, thus warranting their total rejection by the courts);
Murdock, supra note 23 (evaluating alternative remedies for minority stockholders and the
concept of valuation); Zenichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held
Corporations,62 FORDHAM L. REV. 65 (1993) (discussing valuation methods employed by the
courts); Woo, supra note 110 (analyzing the Cineramadecision and evaluating the Delaware
appraisal remedy).
"'Brudney, supra note 1, at 1124.
"Even those who normally argue that unequal allocations of corporate gains can be
efficient concede this point. See Fischel, supra note 218, at 880.
"'See Cohen, supra note 159, at 145.
'See Fischel, supra note 218, at 890 (noting that the market price is generally
influenced by the transaction being dissented from).
" 4 Murdock, supra note 23, at 487.

